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“How glorious it is, but how painful it is also, to be
exceptional in this world!” 1
INTRODUCTION
From time to time, the federal legislature has shown
itself to be decisively responsive to problems both large and
small.
One of those problems is cybersquatting—the
registration of domain names that are similar or identical to
distinctive or famous trademarks for the purpose of confusing
consumers or extorting the trademarks’ holders. In the
remarkably short period between June and November of
1999, Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA or Act), 2 an amendment to the
1. ALFRED DE MUSSET, HISTOIRE D’UN MERLE BLANC [The Story of a White
Blackbird] (1842), translated in BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 488 (17th
ed. 2002).
2. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, S. 1255, 106th Cong.
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1999)). Notwithstanding the title
of the enacting legislation, section 1125(d) is titled “Cyberpiracy prevention.” 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d). Although there is a fine distinction between “cyberpiracy” and
“cybersquatting,” the two are used interchangeably in both the case law and
scholarly literature. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“cyberpiracy” as “[t]he act of registering a well-known name or mark (or one
that is confusingly similar) as a website’s domain name, usu[ally] for the
purpose of deriving revenue,” recognizing “cybersquatting” as “[o]ne form of
cyberpiracy,” and then defining “cybersquatting” as “[t]he act of reserving a
domain name on the Internet, esp[ecially] a name that would be associated with
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Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), to provide
particularized relief from cybersquatting. Recognizing the
need to expand existing traditional trademark law to keep
pace with this particular type of Internet fraud, 3 Congress
passed legislation that created a civil cause of action for the
registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name that is
identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive or famous
mark.
The bad faith of any alleged cybersquatter is a central
component of liability under the ACPA. To protect innocent
registrants, the cause of action only attaches to those with “a
bad faith intent to profit from that mark.” Intending to
narrowly limit the scope of the Act, Congress carefully
“keyed” liability to cybersquatters’s bad faith by making it an
Additionally,
element of the cybersquatting violation. 4
Congress explicitly prescribed the evidence courts should
consider in determining whether such bad faith exists. 5
This bad faith requirement, as well as other provisions of
the ACPA, has created significant confusion about its
a company’s trademark, and then seeking to profit by selling or licensing the
name to the company that has an interest in being identified with it”); see, e.g.,
Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(“Although [plaintiff] refers to this claim as a ‘cyberpiracy’ claim, courts
addressing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) have referred to this section as a ‘cybersquatting’
provision.”); Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954, at
*1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011) (“The Anti–Cybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (‘ACPA’) creates liability for certain forms of cyberpiracy.”); Harrods Ltd. v.
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“as its
title reflects, the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act was designed to
combat ‘cybersquatting’ or ‘cyberpiracy’ ”). Given the prevalence of the term
“cybersquatting” to describe both that particular kind of cyberpiracy and
“cyberpiracy” more generally within the meaning of section 1125(d), the former
term is used here for consistency and easy reading.
3. See Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
1–2 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham); see also Interstellar Starship
Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that
“Cybersquatting is the Internet version of a land grab. Cybersquatters register
well-known brand names as Internet domain names in order to force the
rightful owners of the marks to pay for the right to engage in electronic
commerce under their own name”) (citing Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of
America Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The ACPA was enacted in
1999 in response to concerns over the proliferation of cybersquatting-the
Internet version of a land grab.”)).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d); see also discussion infra Part I.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (listing evidence to be considered in
determining bad faith).
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relationship with traditional trademark law embodied in the
rest of the Lanham Act. The ACPA provides remedies from
cybersquatting, including actual damages, profits, costs,
attorney’s fees “in exceptional cases,” as well as statutory
damages that were already available under the Lanham Act
for other violations of trademark rights. 6 Courts have
struggled to provide an articulation of when a cybersquatting
case is “exceptional.” 7
Under other provisions of the Lanham Act focused on
other trademark disputes, attorney’s fees could be awarded in
cases when a defendant acts in particularly bad faith. 8 But
under the ACPA, bad faith is already an element of liability. 9
This leads to an important question: if bad faith does no more
than define an unexceptional cybersquatter, what defines the
exceptional cybersquatter?
A recent circuit split about Lanham Act remedies
implicates whether attorney’s fees are available in
cybersquatting cases where the plaintiff elects to receive
statutory damages in place of actual damages. 10 The analysis
and discussion of this question are presented in Part II of this
paper, and suggest that attorney’s fees are in fact available to
cybersquatting plaintiffs when they elect to receive statutory
damages. Part III of this paper proceeds to consider the more
vexing and consequential confusion created by the novelty
and centrality of “bad faith intent to profit” in cybersquatting
cases, given that bad faith is a judicially-recognized hallmark
of an “exceptional case” in many jurisdictions and a finding
that a case is exceptional is a threshold determination
necessary to any discretionary award of attorney’s fees under
the Lanham Act. Building on the discussion in Part II, this
Part focuses on cases where statutory damages are available
for substantive violations of the ACPA but attorney’s fees
may not be awarded—not because the text or legislative
history of the statute does not permit such an award per se
6. See discussion infra Part I.A–B (comparing the ACPA with the rest of
the Lanham Act).
7. See discussion infra Part II (describing the circuit split vis-à-vis
attorney’s fees awards under the ACPA and the Lanham Act).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008); see also discussion infra Part II.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
10. See discussion infra Part II (articulating the split in authority
represented by Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Ly USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83 (2d
Cir. 2012) and K & N Eng’g v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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but because the cases are not “exceptional” as the term is
properly understood in context.
This paper argues that in order for the two standards—
“bad faith intent to profit” and “exceptional cases”—to remain
distinct, they must be distinguishable. Attorney’s fees in
trademark cases can only be awarded in “exceptional cases,”
and courts have interpreted “exceptional” to include cases
where the defendant acted in bad faith. And although all
cybersquatting cases require a showing of “bad faith intent to
profit,” not all cybersquatting cases merit an award of
attorney’s fees. Therefore, the definition of what makes a
cybersquatter “exceptional” for the purpose of awarding
attorney’s fees must be something different from simply “bad
faith intent to profit.” This paper attempts to refine the
distinction between the two standards by defining “the
exceptional cybersquatter” and the types of conduct that go
beyond “bad faith intent to profit” and therefore justify an
exercise of the extraordinary discretion to award attorney’s
fees. In short, this paper argues that the exceptional
cybersquatter is one who (1) engages in certain willful
conduct distinguishable from the “bad faith intent to profit”
during the course of litigation or (2) engages in conduct
indistinguishable from the “bad faith intent to profit” but
nevertheless considered willful under the Lanham Act. 11
Notwithstanding the relief provided by the ACPA,
cybersquatting continues to be a problem demonstrated by
the increasing number of cybersquatting claims brought
before courts in the United States 12 and international
arbitration organizations accredited by the Internet
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. A search of Bloomberg Law’s database of all U.S. District Court dockets
for the term “cybersquatting” between November 1999 (when the ACPA was
enacted) and December 31, 2012 returned 27 hits for years 1999 and 2000; 20
for 2001; 28 for 2002; 39 for 2003; 40 for 2004; 56 for 2005; 68 for 2006; 111 for
2007; 168 for 2008; 223 for 2009; 210 for 2010; 268 for 2011; and 318 for 2012.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts provides very useful case statistics
on its website but does not provide the number of cybersquatting cases
commenced during any particular period. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—
CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT,
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING JUNE 30, 2011 AND 2012 30–33 tbl. C2,, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesFor
TheFederalJudiciary/2012/june/C02Jun12.pdf (providing numbers of copyright,
patent, and trademark cases, but not specific types of cases within those
broader, “Nature of Suit” categories).
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Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
including the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO). 13 Given current trends, and ICANN’s introduction of
new top-level domain names in June 2013, 14 cybersquatting
will likely continue to be an important and lively area of the
law for years to come. In fact, some have called on Congress
to amend the ACPA to deal with the threatened explosion of
cybersquatting claims that the new top-level domain names
will ignite. 15 Although legislation may indeed be necessary to
provide relief from that problem, the problems addressed in
this paper—the availability of attorney’s fees when statutory
damages are elected under the ACPA and the distinction
between cases involving exceptional cybersquatters where
attorney’s fees are appropriate and those where they are
not—are wholly remediable through better-informed
application of existing statutory text.

13. In March 2013, WIPO reported a record-setting 2,884 cybersquatting
filings for the previous year, a 4.5% increase in the number of filings from the
year before. See BloombergBNA World Communications. Regulation Report,
Domain Names: WIPO Cites Continued Rise in Cybersquatting Complaints
(April 5, 2013). See also Tenesa S. Scaturro, The Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy the
First Decade: Looking Back and Adapting Forward, 11 Nev. L.J. 877 (2011)
(reporting that 3,866 domain name dispute cases were filed with WIPO and the
National Arbitration Forum in 2009).
14. A top-level domain name refers to a domain at the highest level of the
hierarchical Domain Name System. Examples of top-level domains are .com,
.edu, .mil, etc. Before 2013, companies could register sites on only 22 generic
top-level domains (gTLDs). Ian Paul, The Top 10 Proposed New Top-Level
Domains
So
Far,
PC
WORLD
(Jun.
12,
2012,
10:31
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/257430/the_top_10_proposed_new_top_level_do
mains_so_far.html. ICANN has since received over 1,900 applications for new
gTLDs.
See New GTLD Current Application Status, ICANN,
https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014). It is unclear exactly what effect the new generic top-level
domain names that ICANN plans to implement in June of 2013 will have on the
number of cybersquatting claims in the future. See MELBOURNE IT DIGITAL
BRAND SERVS., GET OFF MY LAWN: 2012 CYBERSQUATTING REVIEW, available at
www.melbourneit.info/news-centre/Releases/2012_Cybersquatting_Report.pdf
(predicting that the new top-level domain names will not likely cause a rise in
the number of cybersquatting claims).
15. See Amy E. Bivens, Group Pushes for ACPA Reform, Citing Added
Cybersquatting Risks From New TLDs, BLOOMBERG BNA ELECTRONIC COM. &
LAW REP. (April 26, 2013).
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I. THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
AND THE LANHAM ACT
Properly considering and resolving the two issues
addressed in this paper first requires a brief overview of the
ACPA and the Lanham Act. The ambiguity in the text and
legislative history of both statutes creates some confusion as
to what remedies are available in certain kinds of trademark
cases, including cybersquatting cases.
This Part first
considers the ACPA, its text, and its history before
summarizing its relationship to the background law of the
Lanham Act and the remedies for trademark infringement,
including cybersquatting, included in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
A. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
The ACPA creates a substantive, civil cause of action for
trademark owners against those who register, traffic in, or
use domain names that are protected trademarks, words, or
names or are identical or confusingly similar to distinctive or
famous marks with “a bad faith intent to profit” from those
marks. 16 Senator Spencer Abraham first introduced the
ACPA in June 1999. 17 This initial proposed legislation
included, among other provisions, the option to elect actual
damages and profits, or statutory damages under the
statutory provision. 18 If a plaintiff sought statutory damages,
the statute provided for an award of “full costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees.” 19 Additionally, the proposed
legislation imposed criminal penalties. 20
Although the initial proposal for the ACPA contained
many of the key provisions that were later enacted, some
substitutes were required before the bill became law. For
example, Senator Abraham acknowledged that suggestions on
the proposed bill “convinced [him] of the need for substitute
legislation which addresses the issue of in rem jurisdiction

16. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (2012).
17. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, S. 1255, 106th Cong.
(1999)).
18. Id. § 3 (trademark remedies). See also 158 CONG. REC. S7336 (daily ed.
Jun. 22, 1999) (“a plaintiff may – instead of seeking actual damages or profits –
elect to recover statutory damages . . . Furthermore, the plaintiff may recover
full costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.”).
19. S. 1255 § 3 (trademark remedies).
20. Id. § 4 (criminal use of counterfeit trademark).
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and which eliminate[s] provisions dealing with criminal
penalties.” 21 Nowhere did Senator Abraham mention the
original bill’s provision for attorney’s fees awards. However,
he did generally describe the substantive provisions of the
substitute legislation, 22 noting that it would “key[] liability on
the bad faith of a party” and “specify the evidence which may
be used to establish the bad faith of an individual,” part of
Congress’s effort to provide complete protection for so-called
“innocent infringers.” 23 Senator Abraham also noted that the
substitute legislation “provides for statutory civil damages”
that the plaintiff may elect “in lieu of actual damages or
profits.” 24
Defining “bad faith intent to profit” by “specif[ying] the
evidence which may be used to establish” it is critical to both
achieving the underlying purpose of the act—the protection of
trademark rights in the Internet age—and the protection of
“innocent infringers.” 25 To that end, the ACPA provides a
non-exclusive list of nine factors that may be considered in
determining whether a person accused of cybersquatting has
the requisite “bad faith intent to profit” from a protected
mark:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of
the person, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the

21. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
2 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham).
22. S. 1255.
23. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
2–3 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham).
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 2–3. See also Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110
F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“Every provision of the ACPA reflects
Congress’s intent to address the cybersquatting problem, not the innocent or
good-faith registration of domain names that may infringe existing trade
marks.”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-464, at 109 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (“The bill is
carefully and narrowly tailored, however, to extend only to cases where the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used
the offending domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a
mark belonging to someone else. Thus, the bill does not extend to innocent
domain name registrations”); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 8 (1999) (“[u]nder the bill
. . . the abusive conduct that is made actionable is appropriately limited just to
bad-faith registrations and uses of others’ marks by persons who seek to profit
unfairly from the goodwill associated therewith”).

CUMBY FINAL

2014]

5/23/2014 12:41 PM

THE EXCEPTIONAL CYBERSQUATTER

307

legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person;
(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or
services;
(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of
the mark in a site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner’s online location to a site accessible under the
domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by
the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to
tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign
the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for
financial gain without having used, or having an intent to
use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any
goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating
a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading
false contact information when applying for the
registration of the domain name, the person’s intentional
failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the
person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which the person knows are identical or
confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive
at the time of registration of such domain names, or
dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the
time of registration of such domain names, without regard
to the goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the
person’s domain name registration is or is not distinctive
and famous within the meaning of subsection (c) of this
section. 26

26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX) (2012) (these factors will be referred
to throughout the remainder of this paper as “ACPA factor one,” “ACPA factor
two,” etc.). Subsection (c) of 15 U.S.C. § 1125 defines and prescribes remedies
for trademark dilution by blurring and tarnishment. See also Cybersquatting
and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name Integrity: Hearing on S.
1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of
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In addition to these factors, the ACPA also provides that
“[b]ad faith intent . . . shall not be found in any case in which
the court determines that the person believed and had
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain
Further,
name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.” 27
cybersquatting liability for using a domain name will only
attach if a “person is the domain name registrant or that
registrant’s authorized licensee.” 28
The importance of the bad faith intent factors should not
be undermined by their permissive, non-exclusive character.
Defining “bad faith intent to profit” is critical in defining
liability under the ACPA, as Senator Abraham stressed at the
first hearing on the proposed legislation that would later
become the ACPA:
The substitute will incorporate substantial protections for
innocent parties, keying liability on the bad faith of a
party. Civil liability would attach only if a person had no
intellectual property rights in the domain name identifier;
the domain name identifier was not the person’s legal first
name or surname; and the person registered, acquired, or
used the domain name identified with the bad-faith intent
to benefit from the goodwill of another’s trademark or
service mark.
And just to be clear of our intent here, this substitute
legislation specifies the evidence which may be used to
establish the bad faith of an individual. 29

This is significant for purposes of distinguishing between
the “specific” intent to profit from the goodwill of a mark
(“bad faith intent to profit”) under the ACPA and the
“general” intent (“bad faith”) sufficient to render a case
“exceptional” under the Lanham Act for purposes of awarding
attorney’s fees in some jurisdictions. 30 The list of factors is
Sen. Spencer Abraham) (“Civil liability would attach only if a person had no
intellectual property rights in the domain name identifier; the domain name
identifier was not the person’s legal first name or surname; and the person
registered, acquired, or used the domain name identified with the bad-faith
intent to benefit from the goodwill of another’s trademark or service mark.”).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (the so-called “safe harbor” provision).
28. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(D).
29. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
2–3 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham).
30. See Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1109 (C.D.
Cal. 2009) (“The bad faith required to support a cybersquatting claim is not
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nonexclusive and nonexhaustive because a defendant may,
for instance, provide erroneous contact information in
registering a domain name or register multiple domain
names that are identical or confusingly similar to a mark
without any “bad faith intent to profit” from the goodwill of
the mark. 31 Thus, as “the presence or absence of any of these
factors may not be determinative” of bad faith intent to
profit, 32 the presence or absence of any of the factors must
also not be determinative of “bad faith” generally.
Early amendments to the ACPA bill also sought to
remedy a pernicious and persistent problem in domain name
litigation—the inability of some plaintiffs to establish the
existence of personal jurisdiction over alleged cybersquatters,
particularly those located outside the United States who
provided deliberately misleading or false contact information
to domain name registrars. 33 Accordingly, the final version of
the ACPA provides for in rem jurisdiction in cases where the
owner of a mark is unable “to obtain in personam
jurisdiction” over a prospective cybersquatting defendant, or
when the owner is unable to find the defendant “through due

general bad faith, but ‘a bad faith intent to profit from the mark,’ 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Thus, the defendant must intend to profit
specifically from the goodwill associated with another’s trademark.”). See infra
notes 182–89 and accompanying text.
31. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 9 (1999) (“[T]he fact that a defendant provided
erroneous information in applying for a domain name registration or registered
multiple domain names that were identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive
of distinctive marks does not necessarily show bad-faith. The Committee
recognizes that such false information may be provided without a bad-faith
intent to trade on the goodwill of another’s mark, and that there are likely to be
instances in which multiple domain name registrations are consistent with
honest business practices. Similar caveats can be made for each of the eight
balancing factors, which is why the list of factors is nonexclusive and
nonexhaustive.”)
32. Id.
33. See Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
14–15 (1999) (statement of Gregory D. Philips, Esq., Porsche Cars North
America, Inc.) (“One necessary component of any effective legislation is an in
rem jurisdictional provision where a trademark holder can file a lawsuit against
the domain name itself, rather than the registrant.
Not surprisingly,
cyberpirates and cybersquatters often provide false and fictitious information as
to their identity when they register a new domain name diluting or infringing a
famous trademark. Cyberpirates do so in order to insulate themselves from
liability and to make it impossible for trademark holders to effect service of
process.”).
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diligence.” 34 Remedies in in rem cases are specifically
“limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of
the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the
owner of the mark.” 35 In in personam cases, “a court may
order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the
transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark,” 36 in
addition to the remedies provided for violations of the ACPA
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
The final version of the ACPA enumerates several
different remedies against cybersquatters. Under section 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a), a plaintiff may recover actual damages and
profits for violations of the ACPA “subject to the principles of
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). In in rem cases, the mark owner
must provide notice “to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and email address provided by the registrant to the registrar” and publish “notice of
the action as the court may direct promptly after filing the action” in order to
effect service of process. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II), (d)(2)(B).
35. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i). See Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection:
Ensuring Domain Name Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 3 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham)
(“Under this legislation, the owner of a mark could bring an in rem action
against the domain name identifier itself. This will allow a court to order the
forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name identifier or the transfer of the
domain name identifier to the owner of the mark.”). But see Agri-Supply Co.,
Inc. v. Agrisupply.com, 457 F. Supp. 2d 660, 665 (E.D. Va. 2006). In AgriSupply, the court reasoned that:
[W]hile § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) of the ACPA states that “[t]he remedies in an
in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to a court order for
the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the
domain name to the owner of the mark,” the statute continues that “the
in rem action established under paragraph (2), and any remedy
available under [that] section, shall be in addition to any other civil
action or remedy otherwise applicable.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) and
(3) (emphasis added). By including § 1125(d) within its provisions for
remedies available for trademark violations within the ambit of the
Lanham Act, § 1117(a) provides the additional civil remedies provided
for in ACPA § 1125(d)(3).
Id. at 665. Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Unitedair.com, No. 1:12CV0143
(GBL/JFA), 2012 WL 2838629, at *6–7 (E.D. Va. Jun. 11, 2012) (distinguishing
Agri-Supply), adopted by, No. 1:12CV143 GBL/JFA, 2012 WL 2838569 (E.D. Va.
Jul. 9, 2012). Even accepting the court’s conclusion in Agri-Supply that
attorney’s fees awards are available in in rem actions despite the express
limitation of in rem remedies “to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation
of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the
mark,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i), the interesting question of whether a res—a
“thing”—is capable of “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful” behavior
such that an in rem case is “exceptional” and an attorney’s fees award is
warranted is outside the scope of this paper.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
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equity.” 37
Congress also amended section 1117 to add
subsection (d), which provides for statutory damages in
cybersquatting cases as an alternative remedy. 38 In language
remarkably similar to section 1117(c) (which provides
statutory damages for trademark counterfeiting rather than
section
1117(d)
provides
that
cybersquatting), 39
cybersquatting plaintiffs “may elect . . . to recover, instead of
actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in
the amount of not less than $1,000 and not more than
$100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.” 40
As discussed below and in light of the similar statutory
damages provision set out in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), the
statutory damages provision provided for in section 1117(d)
However, what
seems relatively uncontroversial. 41
consideration Congress gave to the availability of attorney’s
fees in addition to statutory damages under section 1117(d) (if
any) is worth reviewing here for purposes of later analysis of
that question in Part II. 42 In trademark counterfeiting cases,
attorney’s fees are awarded in addition to statutory damages
under section 1117(c) only in “exceptional cases.” The similar
language in section 1117(d) for cybersquatting cases would
lead one to believe that attorney’s fees would be awarded in
addition to statutory damages in similar circumstances under
the ACPA.
It is remarkable (if not persuasive) to note that the ACPA
bill, as originally introduced, provided for attorney’s fees
awards. Later, section 4 of the amended ACPA (damages and
remedies) omitted mention of awards of attorney’s fees in
cases where statutory damages were elected in place of actual
However, the Senate Judiciary
damages and profits. 43
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008) (prescribing recovery for violations “under
section 1125 . . . (d) of this title,” the ACPA).
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part II.D.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
41. See infra parts II.C–D.
42. See TERENCE P. ROSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND
REMEDIES § 4.03[6] (2013) (“There is no reason . . . to believe that this provision
[1117(d)] will be interpreted any differently from Section 35(c) [1117(c)] of the
Lanham Act providing statutory damages for use of counterfeit marks.”).
43. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 3 (1999). In late October 1999, the House
Judiciary Committee promulgated its own report on the Trademark
Cyberpiracy Prevention Act, first introduced earlier that month. H.R. REP. NO.
106-412 (1999).
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Committee Report noted that “under the amended bill, a
trademark
owner
who
knowingly
and
materially
misrepresents to the domain name registrar or registry that a
domain name is infringing is liable . . . for damages, including
costs and attorney’s fees, resulting from the suspension,
cancellation, or transfer of the domain name.” 44 Thus, even
though the final version of the ACPA did not contain a
specific provision for attorney’s fees in addition to statutory
damages, the language in the Committee Report strongly
suggests that attorney’s fees should be included in the
awarded damages, whether those damages are actual or
statutory.
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report explained the
need for legislation “to clarify the rights of trademark owners
with respect to bad faith, abusive domain name registration
practices, to provide clear deterrence to prevent bad faith and
abusive conduct, and to provide adequate remedies for
trademark owners in those cases where it does occur.” 45
Referring to a provision later codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(3), 46 the report stated that the addition of a
cybersquatting provision to the Trademark Act “does not in
any way limit the application of current provisions of
trademark, unfair competition and false advertising, or
dilution law, or other remedies under counterfeiting or other
statutes, to cybersquatting cases.” 47 In its discussion of the
44. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 11 (1999) (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 7–8. See also Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring
Domain Name Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 3 (1999) (statement of Senator Abraham) (“In my
opinion, online extortion [in the form of cybersquatting] is unacceptable, it is
outrageous, and it is dangerous to both business and consumers. I believe that
these provisions will discourage anyone from squatting on addresses in
cyberspace to which they are not entitled.”).
46. “The civil action established under [15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)] and the in
rem action established under [15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)], and any remedy available
under either such action, shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy
otherwise applicable.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(3) (2012).
47. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 16 (1999). See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14
(1999) (noting that the addition of a cyberpiracy provision to the Trademark Act
did “not in any way limit the application of current provisions of trademark,
unfair competition and false advertising, or dilution law, or other remedies
under counterfeiting or other statutes, to cyberpiracy cases.”). Nevertheless,
the Committee was careful to note the narrowness of the ACPA, stating that
“Congress must not cast its net too broadly or impede the growth of technology,
and it must be careful to balance the legitimate interests of Internet users with
the other interests sought to be protected.” S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 8 (1999).
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damages and remedies provision, the Committee also noted
that this section of the amended bill “applies traditional
trademark remedies, including injunctive relief, recovery of
defendant’s profits, actual damages, and costs, to
cybersquatting cases.” 48
Given this history, the lack of an explicit reference to
attorney’s fees for plaintiff trademark owners is best
understood in comparison to the explicit considerations of
Congress generally in enacting the ACPA—deterrence of
trademark infringement on the Internet, the provision of
adequate remedies to plaintiffs, the continuing salience of
current Lanham Act provisions, and the traditional remedies
to be afforded successful plaintiffs. These considerations
weigh heavily in favor of the conclusion that Congress did not
intend to provide for attorney’s fees to defendants only, as
doing so would undoubtedly undermine extension of the
deterrent and remedial functions of attorney’s fees in the
Lanham Act before the enactment of the ACPA.
B. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act provides for a wide variety of remedies
in cases involving trademark rights violations. What follows
is a brief overview of the various remedies provided under the
Lanham Act and, where relevant, the legislative history of
each. Specific attention is given to section 1117(a), which
provides for actual damages, profits, costs, and attorney’s fees
in “exceptional cases” for trademark infringement (including
cybersquatting), as well as trademark counterfeiting and
false advertising. 49 Section 1117(b) provides for an award of
treble damages and “virtually mandatory” 50 attorney’s fees in
48. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 16–17 (1999). Section 43(d) of the Trademark
Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 15
(1999) (noting that that the legislation “applies traditional trademark remedies,
including injunctive relief, recovery of defendant’s profits, actual damages, and
costs, to cyberpiracy cases under the new section 43(d) of the Trademark Act”).
The Committee also noted the proposed “amendment to section 35 of the
Trademark Act to provide for statutory damages in cybersquatting cases.” S.
REP. NO. 106-140, at 16–17 (1999). Section 35 of the Trademark Act is codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1117. See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 15 (1999) (noting that
the bill also “amended section 35 of the Trademark Act to provide for statutory
damages in cyberpiracy cases.”).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008).
50. See 130 CONG. REC. H12,076 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (Joint Statement
on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation); Richard J. Leighton, Awarding
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cases of intentional trademark counterfeiting where no
“extenuating circumstances” are found.
Finally, section
1117(c) provides for statutory damages in cases of trademark
counterfeiting in language that is remarkably (and
significantly) similar to section 1117(d), which provides for
statutory damages awards in cybersquatting cases. 51
1. Actual Damages, Treble Damages, and Statutory
Damages
The actual damages provision of the Lanham Act, section
1117(a), provides for the recovery of monetary damages for
certain types of trademark rights violations. These violations
include
(1)
ordinary
trademark
infringement
(2)
counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (3) unfair competition,
including “palming off,” false advertising, and trade dress
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (4) willful trademark
dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); and (5) cybersquatting
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 52 Any relief from these acts of
trademark infringement is “subject to the principles of
equity.” 53 One scholar notes that monetary damages awards
for trademark infringement are “a rarity,” given the equitable
discretion this provision affords district courts, the low
threshold for proving trademark rights violations, and the
fundamental differences between trademark, patent, and
copyright law. 54
Attorneys’ Fees in “Exceptional” Lanham Act Cases: A “Jumble” of “Murky” Law,
102 TRADEMARK REP. 849, 864–66 (2012).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), (d).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (prescribing recovery for violations “under section
1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this
title”).
53. Id.
54. ROSS, supra note 42, § 4.02. Ross notes that:
[T]he underlying purpose of trademark protection is different from
copyright protection or patent protection. As one commentator has
noted, “The primary purpose of patent and copyright law is to
encourage innovation and creativity, while trademark law seeks to
avoid deception and confusion of consumers, decrease the cost of
information in the marketplace, ensure fair competition, and protect
producers’ investment in their reputation and goodwill.”
Id. § 4.02 n.4 (quoting 1 DRATLER & MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 1.02[5] n. 48 (1991)).
Ross goes on to note that injunctive relief is preferred in trademark
infringement cases, and monetary damages as a general rule are only awarded
in cases of actual confusion or willful infringement. Id. § 4.02[2]. But see David
M. Kelly & Scott T. Harlan, Statutory Damages Under the Anticybersquatting
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Monetary damages under section 1117(a) are calculated
with respect to (1) the defendant’s profits, (2) the plaintiff’s
actual damages, and (3) the plaintiff’s costs in bringing the
action. 55 Remarkably, the statute goes on to reiterate the
court’s broad equitable discretion 56 in making its damages
calculation:
In assessing damages the court may enter judgment,
according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum
above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding
three times such amount. If the court shall find that the
amount of the recovery based on profits is either
inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion
enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be
just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum
in either of the above circumstances shall constitute
compensation and not a penalty. 57

In 1984, Congress amended the Lanham Act to include
provisions for mandatory treble damages in specific
circumstances. 58 Subsection (b) of 15 U.S.C. § 1117 provides
for mandatory awards of treble damages or profits
(“whichever amount is greater”) and attorney’s fees in cases
where a defendant intentionally used a counterfeit mark in
Before
the absence of “extenuating circumstances.” 59
Consumer Protection Act, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Jun. 13, 2008
(collecting and discussing numerous cases where court have awarded statutory
damages in cybersquatting cases).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to recover (1)
defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs
of the action”); see also ROSS, supra note 42, § 4.03 (stating that that “[t]here are
four distinct approaches to calculating damages for trademark infringement.
First, damages can be calculated based on the trademark owner’s actual loss,
which can include lost profits, price erosion damages, damage to the mark (i.e.,
loss of goodwill) and the expense of corrective advertising. Second, damages can
be calculated based on a reasonable royalty measure. [And t]hird, damages can
be calculated based on the disgorgement of the infringer’s profits.”).
56. ROSS, supra note 42, § 4.03 (“This is an extraordinarily broad
discretionary grant to the district courts.”) (citing Maier Brewing Co. v.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 121 (9th Cir. 1968)).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
58. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2178; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (“In assessing damages under subsection (a) for any
violation of section 1114(1)(a) of this title or section 220506 of Title 36, in a case
involving use of a counterfeit mark or designation (as defined in section 1116(d)
of this title), the court shall, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances,
enter judgment for three times such profits or damages, whichever amount is
greater, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee” for intentional use of a known
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enactment, Congress explained that section 1117(b)
authorized “mandatory or virtually mandatory awards of
treble damages and attorney’s fees” in cases of intentional
and “egregious conduct prohibited by existing law.” 60
“Narrower” than the Lanham Act provisions already in
existence, section 1117(b) only displaced remedies available
at the time of the enactment under the newly designated
section 1117(a) to the extent they were “inconsistent with
subsection (b).” 61 Considering the “exceptional” character of
and discretionary power to award attorney’s fees under
section 1117(a) and the intentional conduct requiring such an
award under 1117(b), Richard Leighton notes that:
All else being equal, [] a case involving a trademark’s
intentional use by a defendant that knows the mark to be
counterfeit certainly would qualify as an “exceptional”
case under Lanham Act Section [1117](a). But Congress
made clear that, under new [1117](b), it would be even
more exceptional for such a defendant to avoid the award
of enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees by asserting the
affirmative defense of extenuating circumstances. 62

More than a decade after the addition of 15 U.S.C. §
1117(b), Congress further amended the Lanham Act to
provide for statutory damages in trademark counterfeiting
cases as an alternative to actual damages and profits. 63
Before enactment of the amendment, Congress “recognize[d]”
that:
[A] civil litigant may not be able to prove actual damages
if a sophisticated, large-scale counterfeiter has hidden or
destroyed information about his counterfeiting . . . .
Moreover,
counterfeiters’
records
are
frequently
nonexistent, inadequate or deceptively kept in order to
willfully deflate the level of counterfeiting activity actually
engaged in, making proving actual damages in these cases
extremely difficult if not impossible. 64

counterfeit mark) (emphasis added).
60. 130 CONG. REC. H12,076 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (Joint Statement on
Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation).
61. Id.
62. Leighton, supra note 50, at 865.
63. Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104153, § 7, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).
64. S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 10 (1995).
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The amendment was enacted with the express purpose of
“[e]nabling trademark owners to elect statutory damages . . .
instead of actual damages” 65 and the text of the statute itself
provides that “the plaintiff may elect . . . to recover, instead of
actual damages and profits under subsection (a) of this
section, an award of statutory damages.” 66 For ordinary
counterfeiting cases, statutory damages may range from
$1,000 to $200,000 “per counterfeit mark per type of goods or
services sold, offered for sale, or distributed, as the court
In cases of “willful” trademark
considers just.” 67
counterfeiting, the court may award damages of up to
$2,000,000 “per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services
sold, offered for sale, or distributed,” again as it “considers
just.” 68
2. Attorney’s Fees (and Presumptions of Willfulness)
In addition to actual damages, profits, and costs, the
Lanham Act also provides for the award of reasonable
attorney’s fees under section 1117(a). Congress included
language allowing that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 69
Congress enacted this provision in 1975 after the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co. 70 in 1967. 71 In Fleischmann, the Court held that
attorney’s fees could not be awarded under the Lanham Act
because Congress had not permitted such an award amongst
the detailed remedial provisions in section 1117.
Before the Fleischmann decision, federal courts exercised
what was thought to be an inherent power to award
attorney’s fees in trademark infringement and unfair
competition cases. Courts exercised this power in the absence
of a statutory grant of authority and contrary to the American
65. Id. (emphasis added) (“This section amends section 35 of the Lanham
Act, allowing civil litigants the option of obtaining discretionary, judicially
imposed damages in trademark counterfeiting cases, instead of actual damages.
. . . Enabling trademark owners to elect statutory damages is both necessary
and appropriate in light of the deception routinely practiced by counterfeiters.”).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).
67. Id. § 1117(c)(1).
68. Id. § 1117(c)(2).
69. Id. § 1117(a).
70. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
71. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat. 1955.
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Rule, which makes such awards the exception and not the
general rule, as is customary in English courts. 72 For
example, in Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that an award of
attorney’s fees as compensatory damages was appropriate in
certain trademark infringement and unfair competition cases
where “willful and fraudulent conduct is sustained by the
evidence.” 73 Although the Lanham Act was enacted without
an attorney’s fees provision, five years after Aladdin, federal
courts relying on that decision continued to make such
awards in “a virtually unbroken string of cases” involving
willful trademark infringement and unfair competition
brought under the Act. 74
In Fleischmann, the Court granted certiorari to consider
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’s decision to reverse an
attorney’s fees award. The Ninth Circuit found that the
Lanham Act did not grant federal courts the power to award
attorney’s fees. 75 Reviewing the historical and precedential
evolution of the American Rule, its justifications, and its
exceptions, the Supreme Court found that the exceptions
“were not . . . developed in the context of statutory causes of
action [like the Lanham Act] for which the legislature had
prescribed intricate remedies.” 76 “[I]n the Lanham Act,” the
Court continued, “Congress meticulously detailed the
remedies available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid
trademark has been infringed,” including injunctive relief and
monetary relief in the form of plaintiff’s damages, defendant’s
profits, and costs. 77 The Court concluded by stating that
“[w]hen a cause of action has been created by a statute which
expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause,
72. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (per curiam) (“We
do not think that this charge [$1600 in attorney’s fees] ought to be allowed. The
general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the
court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.”); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (“In the United States, the prevailing
litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the
loser.”).
73. Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F.2d 708, 716–17
(7th Cir. 1941).
74. Leighton, supra note 50, at 857–58.
75. Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 716.
76. Id. at 717–19.
77. Id. at 719.
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other remedies should not readily be implied” 78 and then allbut invited Congress to explicitly provide for attorney’s fees
under the Lanham Act by citing examples where it had done
so in the Patent and Copyright acts, among others. 79
Shortly after the Fleischmann decision, Congress set
about restoring federal courts’ ability to award attorney’s fees
in trademark cases. In June 1973, Representative Robert W.
Kastenmeier introduced a bill to amend the Lanham Act and
provide for the same kind of attorney’s fees awards the
Supreme Court denied in Fleischmann by adding a sentence
to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 that reads (in its entirety): “The court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
The following month, the House
prevailing party.” 80
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice (chaired by
Representative Kastenmeier) held a hearing where Rene
Tegtmeyer, Acting Commissioner of Patents, was the lone
witness. 81 Commissioner Tegtmeyer testified that “equitable
considerations” justified an exception to the American Rule
presumptively denying attorney’s fees awards to prevailing
parties in trademark suits and argued that successful parties
“should be entitled to full compensation for injuries sustained
and expenses incurred, since these were necessitated by the
Contrary to fears that
acts of the opposing party.” 82
attorney’s fees might become “exorbitant” or difficult to
calculate, Commission Tegtmeyer testified that they “may
well be consequential and foreseeable, and judges and
78. Id. at 720 (citing Philp v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460 (1873); Teese v.
Huntingdon, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 2 (1860); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
363 (1852)).
79. Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 720–21. Associate Justice Potter Stewart, the
lone dissenter, argued that it was “reasonable to assume that when Congress in
the Lanham Act empowered courts to grant relief ‘subject to the principles of
equity’ [15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)] it was aware of the Aladdin decision and intended
to preserve the rule of that case.” Id. at 722. Absent an overruling of Aladdin
by Congress, Justice Stewart would have allowed federal courts to continue to
exercise their equitable powers to award attorney’s fees in Lanham Act cases
upon a finding of willful trademark infringement or unfair competition. Id. at
723.
80. Patents-Filing Oppositions Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat.
1955; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008).
81. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (1973).
82. Id.
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masters are capable of determining reasonable fees.” 83
Echoing the Fleischmann Court’s opinion, Commissioner
Tegtmeyer also cited the various federal statutes, including
the Patent and Copyright acts, which expressly provided for
attorney’s fees awards. 84
At the hearing, Commission Tegtmeyer noted that the
proposed amendment expressly limited attorney’s fee awards
to “exceptional cases,” and that such awards were also
Speaking on behalf of the Commerce
discretionary. 85
Department, 86 Commissioner Tegtmeyer testified that “[w]e
understand the phrase ‘exceptional cases’ to permit recovery
of attorney’s fees from infringers only where the acts of
infringement might be characterized as ‘malicious,’
‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate’ or willful.” 87
Commissioner Tegtmeyer also testified to the
interrelationship of existing remedies under the Lanham Act
with attorney’s fees awards:
The Trademark Act currently provides for awarding treble
damages in appropriate circumstances in order to
encourage the enforcement of trademark rights. The
availability of treble damages, however, cannot be
83. Id.
84. Id. The Patent Act’s attorney’s fees provision reads: “The court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2014). The Copyright Act provides:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow
the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United
States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title,
the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing
party as part of the costs.
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2014).
85. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer,
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce).
86. Leighton notes that although “[t]he legislative history does not reveal
whether the Commerce Department drafted H.R. 8981, [] that would not be
surprising.” Leighton, supra note 50, at 860. H.R. 8981 was introduced at the
Commerce Department’s request. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199,
and S. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 1 (1973).
87. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer,
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce). Commissioner Tegtmeyer also
noted that the proposed attorney’s fees provision “would also permit prevailing
defendants to recover attorney fees in exceptional cases.” Id.
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regarded as a substitute for the recovery of attorney fees.
In suits brought primarily to obtain an injunction,
attorney fees may be more important than treble
damages. Frequently, in a flagrant case of infringement
where the court action is instituted promptly, the
measurable damages are nominal. Nonetheless, attorney
fees may be substantial.
The Trademark Act as
amended . . . would make clear that a court has discretion
as to whether to award attorney fees, treble damages, or
both, or neither. 88

The House Judiciary Committee Report promulgated
following the hearing also stated that “[t]he attorney fee
remedy should coexist with [the] existing provision for treble
damages and attorney fees should also be available to
defendants in exceptional cases.” 89
Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
promulgated reports containing statements substantially
similar to Commissioner Tegtmeyer’s testimony. 90 Both
reports’ sectional analyses stated that:
Section 3 provides that attorney fees may be awarded to
the prevailing party in actions under the federal
trademark laws, when equitable considerations justify
such awards. It would make a trademark owner’s remedy
complete in enforcing his mark against willful infringers,
and would give defendants a remedy against unfounded
suits. 91

The amendment adding attorney’s fees to the remedies
available for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act
became law in January 1975. 92 The House Report and the
following Senate Report also stated that the amendment
would authorize attorney’s fees awards “where justified by
equitable
considerations”
and
defined
“exceptional”
infringement cases as those “where the acts of infringement
can be characterized as ‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’
or ‘willful.’ ” 93

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
1955.
93.

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 2 (1973).
Id. at 2–6; S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2–6 (1974).
H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 6 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (1974).
Patents-Filing Oppositions Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 1–2 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1–2 (1974).
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In December 2004 (following enactment of the ACPA and
section 1117(d)), Congress further amended section 1117 to
include a presumption of willful violation where a violator
knowingly gives false information when registering a domain
name. Specifically, section 1117(e) provides that:
In the case of a violation referred to in this section, it shall
be a rebuttable presumption that the violation is willful
for purposes of determining relief if the violator, or a
person acting in concert with the violator, knowingly
provided or knowingly caused to be provided materially
false contact information to a domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name registration
authority in registering, maintaining, or renewing a
domain name used in connection with the violation.
Nothing in this subsection limits what may be considered
a willful violation under this section. 94

According to the House Judiciary Committee Report, this
section creates a test to determine whether a violation within
the ambit of section 1117 is “willful” and “ensures that only
those who attempt to mask their identity in connection with
another violation of the Trademark Act” will be subject to
“the additional civil penalties that result from willful
infringement,” absent the ability to offer evidence to rebut the
presumption. 95
There is a textual overlap and thus an apparent tension
between subsection (e) (knowingly providing materially false
contact information in registering, maintaining, or renewing
a domain name) and ACPA factor seven (providing material
and misleading false contact information when applying for
94. Intellectual Property Protection and Courts Amendments Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-482, 118 Stat 3912.
95. H.R. REP. NO. 108-536, at 3, 6–7 (2004). Congress intended subsection
(e) to establish a five-part test to determine whether a violation is willful (which
does not appear in the text of the statute itself):
(1) The domain name registration must be materially false.
(2) The information must have been knowingly provided or knowingly
caused to be provided.
(3) The recipient of the information must be a domain name registrar,
registry, or other domain name registration authority (such as ICANN
or its successor).
(4) The information must be provided for the purpose of registering,
maintaining, or renewing a domain name.
(5) The domain name must have been used in connection with a
violation.
Id. at 6.
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the registration of the domain name).
However, it is
important to note that subsection (e) establishes a rebuttable
presumption of “willfulness,” not a rebuttable presumption of
“bad faith intent to profit.” This is consistent with Congress’s
intent in creating the nonexclusive, nonexhaustive list of bad
faith intent factors:
[T]he fact that a defendant provided erroneous
information in applying for a domain name registration or
registered multiple domain names that were identical to,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of distinctive marks does
not necessarily show bad-faith. The Committee recognizes
that such false information may be provided without a
bad-faith intent to trade on the goodwill of another’s
mark, and that there are likely to be instances in which
multiple domain name registrations are consistent with
honest business practices. Similar caveats can be made
for each of the eight balancing factors, which is why the
list of factors is nonexclusive and nonexhaustive. 96

Further, subsection (e) establishes a rebuttable
presumption that the violation is willful “for purposes of
determining relief,” not for purposes of initially determining
whether the ACPA has been violated. Thus, subsection (e)
becomes significant for purposes of relief—including
attorney’s fees—only after an ACPA violation is established.
Subsection (e) may then be considered in determining
whether or not a case is “exceptional” for purposes of
attorney’s fees awards under subsection (a). 97
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: STATUTORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S
FEES UNDER THE LANHAM ACT AND THE ACPA
A recent circuit split highlights the uncertainty in
deciding the first question this article attempts to answer:
whether attorney’s fees are available under section 1117(a) to
Lanham Act plaintiffs who seek statutory damages in place of
actual damages and profits. This Part provides an overview
of the split by reviewing the relevant circuit court decisions
and proceeds to argue not only that attorney’s fees are
available to Lanham Act plaintiffs who elect to receive
statutory damages for trademark counterfeiting violations

96. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 9–10 (1999).
97. See infra Part III.B.3.
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under section 1117(c) (as the Second Circuit has held), but
that they are also available to ACPA plaintiffs who elect to
receive statutory damages for cybersquatting violations under
section 1117(d).
A. Ninth Circuit – Electing to Receive Statutory Damages
Precludes an Award of Both Treble Damages and Attorney’s
Fees under the Lanham Act
In December 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided that an award of statutory damages for trademark
counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) precluded an award
of attorney’s fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 98 The plaintiff,
an aftermarket automotive accessory manufacturer and
owner of two registered trademarks, filed suit against
defendants alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting,
and dilution under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125. 99 In its
complaint, plaintiff elected to receive statutory damages
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). 100 After the district court granted
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on all claims, it
awarded $20,000 in statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. §
1117(c)(1) and $100,000 in attorney’s fees under section
1117(b). 101
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
attorney’s fees could not be awarded when the plaintiff
elected to receive statutory damages under section 1117(c)
rather than actual damages under section 1117(a). The court
observed that under section 1117(a), a plaintiff seeking actual
damages could be awarded attorney’s fees in “exceptional
cases.” Further, in cases involving counterfeit marks, under
section 1117(b), a plaintiff could recover three times the
actual damages recoverable under section 1117(a) plus
reasonable attorney’s fees “in every case” in the absence of
extenuating circumstances. But under section 1117(c), a
plaintiff that chooses to “eschew” actual damages under

98. K & N Eng’g v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007).
99. Id. at 1080–81.
100. Id. at 1081.
101. Id. (“Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1) and (b) respectively, the district
court awarded K & N statutory damages of $20,000 and attorney’s fees of
$100,000.”). Under Section 1117(c), a plaintiff may elect to recover statutory
damages “at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court.” 15
U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2008).
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section 1117(a) and seek statutory damages instead would
not be awarded attorney’s fees or treble damages. 102 The
court noted that section 1117(c) “makes no provision for
attorney’s fees; nor does section 1117(b) authorize such fees
for a plaintiff seeking statutory damages under section
1117(c). Section 1117(b)’s attorney’s fees provision applies
only in cases with actual damages under section 1117(a).” 103
Thus, because the plaintiff elected to receive statutory
damages under section 1117(c) and because the district court
“did not assess or award” actual damages under section
1117(a), the court concluded that there was “no statutory
basis to award . . . attorney’s fees under section 1117(b).” 104
Notwithstanding language in the opinion strongly
suggesting that an award of attorney’s fees in Lanham Act
cases is tied to an award of actual damages under section
1117(a) (or trebled actual damages under 1117(b)), the court
expressly reserved “the issue whether an election to receive
statutory damages under section 1117(c) precludes an award
of attorney’s fees for exceptional cases under the final
sentence of section 1117(a).” 105 That question was answered
in early 2012 in the Second Circuit.
B. Second Circuit – Electing to Receive Statutory Damages
Does Not Preclude an Award of Attorney’s Fees under the
Lanham Act
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, a recent Second Circuit
decision concluded that attorney’s fees could be awarded
where the plaintiff elects statutory damages. In Louis
Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Ly USA, Inc., 106 the famous French
fashion house brought suit against defendants alleging
trademark counterfeiting, infringement, and dilution and
false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a),
and 1125(c). 107 In 2008, the district court granted plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment on its trademark
counterfeiting and infringement claims. 108 Plaintiff requested
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

K & N Eng’g, 510 F.3d at 1081–82.
Id. at 1082.
Id.
Id. at 1082 n.5.
676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 92–93.
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the maximum statutory damages available under the
Lanham Act in addition to attorney’s fees, costs, and
Over defendants’s objections, the
investigative fees. 109
district court awarded plaintiff $3,000,000 in statutory
damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and over $500,000 in
attorney’s fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 110
Recognizing the typical availability of attorney’s fees in cases
where actual damages, but not statutory damages, are
awarded, the district court nonetheless found that attorney’s
fees in addition to statutory damages were appropriate. 111
On appeal, defendants argued that because the plaintiff
elected to receive statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. §
1117(c), plaintiff “waived” its ability to receive an award of
attorney’s fees under section 1117(a). 112 Defendants relied on
the text of the statute, reasoning that 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a)
and (b) expressly provide for attorney’s fees awards and
subsection (c) does not. 113 Defendants also relied on a series
of district court decisions finding that the election of statutory
damages precludes an attorney’s fees award and on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in K and N Engineering. 114
The Second Circuit found the issue “plain”: does the
choice to seek statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)
“supplant” only “the method for ascertaining the amount of
damages” under subsection (a) (leaving the provision
regarding attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” “unaffected”)
or “the entirety” of section (a) (including the provision for
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases”)? 115 In other words, does
subsection (c) provide an alternative remedy to actual
damages under subsection (a), or an alternative to all of the
remedies provided in subsection (a)? The court first noted the
explicit disagreement in its district courts on this issue, as
well as those instances where district courts either
acknowledged the issue “without proffering an answer to it”;
“avoid[ed] confronting the issue by implicitly or explicitly
accounting for the cost of attorney’s fees in setting the

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 104.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 104–05.
Id. at 106.
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amount of the statutory-damages award”; or awarded
attorney’s fees under subsection (a) and statutory damages
under subsection (c) “without acknowledging the potential
statutory hurdle they had to clear in doing so.” 116
Turning to the decision in K & N Engineering, the Second
Circuit noted that the Ninth Circuit recognized but did not
resolve the issue in a “critically different” case where the
plaintiff sought statutory damages and attorney’s fees under
sections (c) and (b), and not, as in the present case, under
sections (c) and (a). 117 The Second Circuit also noted a
disagreement among commentators as to the availability of
both statutory damages and attorney’s fees under sections
1117(a) and (c). 118
Engaging in its own analysis of the plain meaning of the
statutory text, the Second Circuit first noted that section
1117(a) distinguishes between a plaintiff’s recovery of actual
damages, profits, and costs and a court’s “discretionary award
of attorney’s fees in exceptional circumstances.” 119 The court
went on to state that in the Second Circuit, “exceptional”
cases necessarily involved trademark infringement that was
“willful” or in “bad faith.” 120 The text of section 1117(c), the
court explained, allows plaintiffs to recover statutory
damages “instead of actual damages and profits under
subsection (a).” 121 Thus, given the distinction between the
awards under subsection (a) and the provision under
subsection (c) for statutory damages “instead of actual
116. Id. at 106–07.
117. Id. at 107–08. The Second Circuit speculated that the plaintiffs in K &
N Engineering might “have sought attorney’s fees under section 1117(b) rather
than section 1117(a) because the former provides for an automatic grant of
attorney’s fees together with damages, while the latter only provides for
attorney’s fees in ‘exceptional cases,’ as discussed previously.” Id. at 108.
118. Id. at 108. Cf. 4 Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and
Monopolies § 23:67 (4th ed. 2011) (“[A] prevailing plaintiff who elects statutory
damages under the Lanham Act in a counterfeiting case is not entitled to
attorney’s fees.”) with 5 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
30:95 n.9 (4th ed. 2012) (describing the Ninth Circuit’s K & N Engineering
decision in the subsection (b) context as “a hyper-technical reading of the
statute” and lamenting that it fails “to read Lanham Act § 35 as an integrated
whole”)
Id. (alteration in original).
119. Id.
120. Id. at108–09 (citing Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d
209, 221 (2d Cir. 2003)).
121. Id. at 109; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2008).
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damages and profits under subsection (a),” awards of
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” are “not foreclosed” in
cases where a plaintiff elects to receive statutory rather than
actual damages. 122
Although the court found this interpretation of the
statutory text “compelling” and concluded that “so long as the
‘exceptional case’ requirement . . . is met, the text of sections
1117(a) and 1117(c) leaves an award of attorney’s fees within
the discretion of the district court,” two of the three judges
acknowledged “at least some ambiguity” in the text and
continued their analysis to consider the legislative history of
and intent behind the enactment of section 1117(c). 123 The
court first observed that, before enactment of the
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act in 1996, 124
remedies for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act
were limited to actual damages, profits, costs, and attorney’s
fees “in exceptional cases” under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and
treble damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and prejudgment
interest in cases of willful counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. §
1117(b). 125 Citing the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 1995
report on the proposed legislation to add section (c), the court
observed that “Congress appears to have been motivated by a
gap in the law” that existed when successful plaintiffs in
trademark counterfeiting suits were nonetheless “unable to
obtain an adequate recovery in actual damages because
counterfeiters often maintain sparse business records, if any
at all.” 126 Further, the court explained that the present case
exemplified the “gap” Congress recognized and attempted to
fill by providing a statutory damages alternative in
trademark counterfeiting suits, as the district court
“concluded that the defendants were responsible for a
‘massive counterfeiting enterprise’ based at least in part on
122. Ly, 676 F.3d at 109.
123. Id. at 109 n.26.
124. Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104153, 110 Stat. 1386. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
125. Ly, 676 F.3d at 110.
126. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 10 (1995) (“The committee recognizes
that under current law, a civil litigant may not be able to prove actual damages
if a sophisticated, large-scale counterfeiter has hidden or destroyed information
about his counterfeiting. Moreover, counterfeiters’ records are frequently
nonexistent, inadequate or deceptively kept in order to willfully deflate the level
of counterfeiting activity actually engaged in, making proving actual damages
in these cases extremely difficult if not impossible.”)).
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plaintiff’s allegations and the unavailability of records
suggesting otherwise.” 127
Consistent with their analysis of the statutory text, the
court concluded that the amendment to the Lanham Act
adding subsection (c) “was thus apparently designed to
provide an alternative to the type of recovery provided in
section 1117(a); not to all of the remedies provided for in that
section” and that the amendment “was meant to expand the
range of remedies available to a trademark plaintiff, not
restrict them.” 128 Given that remedial purpose, the court
went on to state that it was “unlikely that Congress intended
to prevent a plaintiff who opts to recover statutory damages
from also receiving attorney’s fees,” especially given the lack
of any evidence that Congress “intended a tradeoff between
statutory damages and both actual damages and attorney’s
fees” in the amendment’s legislative history. 129 The court
further opined that “it makes little sense . . . to further
reward a defendant successful in defeating the plaintiff’s and
the court’s attempts to fix the actual amount of damages by
allowing him or her to avoid an award of attorney’s fees.” 130
The court then concluded that attorney’s fees awards are
available in “exceptional cases” under section 1117(a) “even
for those plaintiffs who opt to receive statutory damages
under section 1117(c).” 131
C. Evidence from the Legislative History of the Lanham Act –
Electing to Receive Actual or Statutory Damages Does Not
Preclude an Award of Attorney’s Fees
In at least one respect, the Ninth and Second Circuit
decisions summarized above do not represent a genuine
circuit “split” as that term is usually understood. 132 After all,
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 110–11.
131. Id. at 111.
132. See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari will be
granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling
nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons
the Court considers: (a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision
in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the
same important matter . . .”) (emphasis added); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246–52
(1991) (discussing circuit conflicts, or “splits,” as a criteria for determining
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the issues before the two courts, as the Second Circuit
recognized, were different. 133 K and N Engineering involved
construction of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and (b): the former
provides for awards of actual damages and profits, costs, and
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” for trademark
infringement (including counterfeiting) and the latter
provides for treble damages and attorney’s fees for knowing
trademark counterfeiting in the absence of “extenuating
Thus, although not necessarily selfcircumstances.” 134
evident, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the two provisions
“overlap,” making the election of damages under one
preclusive of an award under the other, is both reasonable
and logical.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Ly, on the other hand,
involved construction of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and (c). 135
Subsection (c) provides for statutory damages for trademark
counterfeiting (as opposed to treble damages under
subsection (b)) and does not separately provide for an
attorney’s fees award (in either the presence or absence of
“extenuating circumstances,” as under subsection (b)). 136
Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in K and N
Engineering, then, the reasonable inferences drawn solely
from the text of the statute suggest that the Ly decision
reading the two subsections as interdependent and
compatible is also reasonable and logical.
This section provides additional support for the Second
Circuit’s conclusion by incorporating other evidence from the
legislative history of the attorney’s fees provision in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a)—which neither the Second nor the Ninth Circuit
courts considered in their analyses—as a precursor to
applying the Second Circuit’s construction of subsection (c) to
subsection (d) (providing statutory damages in cybersquatting
cases) in Part II-D below.
1. Acknowledging the Textual Ambiguity in Section 1117
As an initial matter, it must be acknowledged that some
ambiguity exists in the text of section 1117 before proceeding
“certworthiness”).
133. Ly, 676 F.3d at 107–08.
134. K & N Engineering v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007).
135. Ly, 676 F.3d at 106.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b), (c) (2008).
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to consider additional legislative history. If there were no
ambiguity—if the statute “spoke for itself”—neither the
Second Circuit’s analysis of the legislative history of section
1117(c), nor the additional analysis of section 1117(a) offered
in this paper, would be necessary or justified. 137
A comparison of subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) suggests
there is at least some ambiguity 138 in the text of section 1117
that requires recourse to extrinsic legislative materials to
fully understand the appropriate application of the statute.
Subsection (a) provides for actual damages, profits, costs, and
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” 139 for trademark
infringement,
including
ordinary
infringement,
counterfeiting, unfair competition, and willful trademark
dilution. 140 Subsection (b) provides for treble damages for
trademark counterfeiting “[i]n assessing damages under
subsection (a)” and mandates attorney’s fees where no
“extenuating circumstances” exist. 141 Subsection (c), which
provides statutory damages in trademark counterfeiting
cases, references subsection (a) but includes no provision for
Subsection (d), which provides
attorney’s fees itself. 142
statutory damages in cybersquatting cases, does not reference
subsection (a) and also makes no provision for attorney’s
137. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568
(2005) (“As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the
statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.
Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent
they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of
otherwise ambiguous terms.”). This issue is particularly relevant here, as one of
the three circuit judges empanelled to decide the issues presented in Ly believed
that the text at issue was unambiguous and did not join in the court’s discussion
of the legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). Ly, 676 F.3d at 109 n.26.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 258 (1959)
(“Awkwardness is not ambiguity, nor do defined multiple meanings . . .
constitute a want of definiteness.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining ambiguity as “[a]n uncertainty of meaning or intention, as in a
contractual term or statutory provision.”).
139. A fuller discussion of the ambiguity inherent in these two words follows
in Part III.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (prescribing recovery for violations “under section
1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this
title”).
141. Id. § 1117(b).
142. Id. § 1117(c) (“In a case involving the use of a counterfeit mark . . . the
plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial
court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits under subsection (a) of
this section, an award of statutory damages”).
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fees. 143
The Second Circuit noted that “[t]he fact that section
1117(b) expressly provides for attorney’s fees arguably
indicates that section 1117(c)’s lack of an attorney’s fee
provision reflects an intent not to allow the award of fees in
statutory-damages cases.” 144 The same implication could be
drawn from the lack of an attorney’s fees provision in section
1117(d), particularly given the marked similarity of the text
of both sections. 145
In addition, it should be noted that the legislative history
of 15 U.S.C. § 1117 considered here is discrete and not
“murky, ambiguous, and contradictory” such that it is a
suspect source of clarification on this particular point. 146
Thankfully, the relevant legislative histories are short (the
ACPA went from introduction to enactment in less than six
months) and, in many instances, repetitive 147 and therefore
not amenable to the sort of “cherry picking” that make some
excursions into extrinsic materials especially “vulnerable . . .
to criticism.” 148

143. Id. § 1117(d) (“In a case involving a violation of section 1125(d)(1) of this
title [the ACPA], the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an
award of statutory damages”).
144. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Ly USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 109 n.25 (2d
Cir. 2012).
145. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text (comparing (c) and (d)).
146. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)
(noting that“[n]ot all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into
legislative understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is
vulnerable to two serious criticisms. First, legislative history is itself often
murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. . . . Second, judicial reliance on
legislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to
the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—
or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the
incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure
results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.”).
147. See supra Part I.A–B.
148. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 568 (noting that “[j]udicial investigation of
legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow Judge Leventhal’s
memorable phrase, an exercise in ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends.’ ” ). Given the size of the legislative history here and the light it sheds
on the text, the author respectfully submits that the crowd is small and mostly
made up of friends.
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2. The Textual Ambiguity Can Be Resolved by
Considering the Legislative History of Both
Sections (a) and (c)
Analyzing the text of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and (c), the
Second Circuit observed that the latter’s provision of
statutory damages “instead of actual damages and profits
under subsection (a)” meant that it was “a carveout for part of
the remedy otherwise available under section 1117(a): ‘actual
damages and profits.’ ” 149 Thus, the election of statutory
damages under subsection (c) did not “supplant the entirety
of subsection (a) including the provision for attorney’s fees in
‘exceptional cases.’ ” 150
In analyzing the legislative history of subsection (c) (but
not subsection (a)), the court concluded that this textual
reading was entirely consistent with Congress’s intent to
remedy a “gap” in the law created when actual damages are
difficult to prove (given counterfeiters’ deliberate or negligent
record keeping) by enacting an alternative, statutory
damages provision. 151 The court also rejected the notion that
Congress intended to create an alternative remedy to all of
the remedies provided for in subsection (a) (including
attorney’s fees), particularly given the remedial nature of the
statute, or to restrict the remedies available to plaintiffs in
trademark infringement cases. 152
Additionally, the legislative history of section (a)’s
attorney’s fees remedy provides additional support for these
conclusions that was not considered by the Second Circuit.
First, Commissioner Tegtmeyer’s testimony at the only
hearing in which the amendment providing for attorney’s fees
was considered heavily emphasized the “equitable
considerations” justifying an exception to the American Rule,
as well as successful parties’ entitlement to “full
compensation for injuries sustained and expenses incurred”
in trademark infringement cases. 153 This equitable emphasis
149. Ly, 676 F.3d at 109 (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 110 n.27 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 10 (1995)).
152. Id. at 110 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-556 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-177
(1995)).
153. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 14 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer,
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce).
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was reiterated in both the House and Senate reports that
followed the hearing. 154
Commissioner
Tegtmeyer
also
emphasized
the
discretionary nature of attorney’s fees awards in this context
and their limitation to exceptional cases. 155 Both of these
considerations were key to the Second Circuit’s comparison of
subsections (a), (b), and (c) and its rejection of the idea that
the express provision of attorney’s fees in section (b) and the
omission of the same in section (c) “reflects an intent not to
allow the award of fees in statutory-damages cases.” 156
Conversely, the court reasoned that:
The fact that both sections 1117(a) and 1117(b) specifically
allow for attorney’s fees suggests that section 1117(c) also
allows for them, especially in light of the purpose of that
subsection, and that it does so by retaining the
“exceptional case” provision of section 1117(a).
The
attorney’s fee provisions of sections 1117(a) and (b) differ
in an important respect: the former is subject to the
“exceptional case” requirement, and is therefore
discretionary, while the latter is mandatory. 157

Importantly, Commissioner Tegtmeyer and the House
and Senate reports on the bill also noted that attorney’s fees
awards were meant to be an additional—rather than an
alternative—remedy that, with others, were meant to afford
trademark
infringement
plaintiffs
complete
relief.
Commissioner Tegtmeyer specifically testified that awards of
treble damages under subsection (a) 158 “cannot be regarded as
a substitute for the recovery of attorney fees,” particularly
“[i]n suits brought primarily to obtain an injunction” where
“attorney fees may be more important than treble damages”
because the suits are “instituted promptly,” actual damages
154. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 1, 2, 6 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1, 2, 6
(1974).
155. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer,
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce).
156. Ly, 676 F.3d at 109 n.25.
157. Id.
158. “In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual
damages, not exceeding three times such amount.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008).
The treble damages under subsection (a) and those available under the laterenacted subsection (b) are, of course, distinguishable.
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are therefore “nominal,” but “attorney fees may be
substantial.” 159 Commissioner Tegtmeyer went on to state
that “[t]he Trademark Act as amended . . . would make clear
that a court has discretion as to whether to award attorney
fees, treble damages, or both, or neither.” 160 The House
Report also noted that attorney’s fees awards should “coexist”
with existing remedies under section 1117. 161 Finally, both
the House and Senate reports reasoned that attorney’s fees
awards “would make a trademark owner’s remedy complete
in enforcing his mark against willful infringers.” 162
This history is important as the inability to substitute
treble damages available under subsection (a) for attorney’s
fees strongly suggests that statutory damages (under either
subsection (c) or (d)) are similarly not a substitute for
attorney’s fees. Both treble damages and statutory damages
are remedies responsive to the unique facts of a case whose
calculation is committed to the discretion of the trial court.
Subsection (a) provides that “[i]n assessing damages the court
may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the
case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages,
Similarly,
not exceeding three times such amount.” 163
subsections (c) and (d) provide for a range of statutory
damages as an alternative to actual damages and profits in
cases where calculation of the latter is difficult (if not
impossible). 164
All of the considerations underlying the addition of an
attorney’s fees provision in subsection (a)—the equitable
nature of attorney’s fees awards; the discretionary power to
make attorney’s fees awards only in “exceptional cases”; the
character of attorney’s fees awards as an additional, rather
than alternative, remedy; and their purpose in providing
complete relief—are consistent with the considerations the
Second Circuit surveyed in analyzing subsection (c), and that
consistency provides further support to the court’s conclusion
159. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer,
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce).
160. Id.
161. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 2 (1973).
162. Id. at 6; S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (1974).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
164. See id. § 1117(c), (d).
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that Congress intended attorney’s fees awards to accompany
awards of statutory damages in “exceptional cases.”
D. Attorney’s Fees are Available in “Exceptional Cases” under
the ACPA Where the Plaintiff Elects to Receive Statutory
Damages, Just as in “Exceptional Cases” Where the Plaintiff
Elects to Receive Actual Damages
In light of the Second Circuit’s decision and its discussion
of the legislative history of subsection (c), as well as the
discussion of the legislative history behind subsection (a)
presented here, this paper now turns to a discussion of the
text and legislative history of subsection (d) to argue that
attorney’s fees are available in “exceptional cases” when a
cybersquatting plaintiff elects to receive statutory damages
under subsection (d). As noted before, the text of subsections
(c) and (d) are substantially similar. Subsection (c) reads:
In a case involving the use of a counterfeit mark (as
defined in section 1116(d) of this title) in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or
services, the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final
judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead
of actual damages and profits under subsection (a) of this
section, an award of statutory damages for any such use in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution
of goods or services in the amount of—
(1) not less than $1,000 or more than $200,000 per
counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered
for sale, or distributed, as the court considers just; or
(2) if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark
was willful, not more than $2,000,000 per counterfeit
mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or
distributed, as the court considers just. 165

Subsection (d) reads:
In a case involving a violation of section 1125(d)(1) of this
title, the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final
judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead
of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory
damages in the amount of not less than $1,000 and not
more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court

165. Id. § 1117(c) (emphasis added).
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considers just. 166

Identical language in both subsections provides that “the
plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits . . . an award of statutory damages . . . as
the court considers just.” Importantly, the text of both
subsections is clear that statutory damages sought under
either are available as an alternative to actual damages and
profits, arguably leaving the opportunity to recover attorney’s
fees under subsection (a) in place.
The same conclusion is reached when one applies the
Second Circuit’s textual analysis to a case where a
cybersquatting plaintiff elects to receive statutory damages
for a violation of the ACPA under subsection (d) and seeks to
recover attorney’s fees under subsection (a). Subsection (a)
distinguishes between awards of actual damages and profits
in cybersquatting cases generally and awards of attorney’s
fees in “exceptional” cybersquatting cases, and subsection (d)
is a carveout for the former in cases where a plaintiff elects to
receive statutory damages “instead” of actual damages and
profits. Further, nothing in subsection (d) (unlike subsection
(b)) hampers the court’s discretion in awarding attorney’s fees
in “exceptional cases” when statutory damages are chosen as
an alternative remedy. 167
Given the substantial similarity between subsections (c)
and (d), as well as the minor differences in their texts (most
significantly subsection (c)’s express reference to subsection
(a), a reference subsection (d) does not include), it is
reasonable to assume the same ambiguity that may be found
in the former is also present in the latter, making recourse to
the legislative history of the ACPA appropriate in an effort to
better understand Congress’s intent in providing statutory
damages relief in cybersquatting cases.
First, it should be noted that with the exception of the
first version of the ACPA, later supplanted by substitute
166. Id. § 1117(d) (emphasis added).
167. As a textual matter, this conclusion holds notwithstanding the explicit
reference to subsection (a) in subsection (c) and the omission of a similar
reference in subsection (d). Both subsections provide for statutory damages
“instead of actual damages and profits,” and no provision other than subsection
(a) is implicated as no other provision under section 1117 (or the Lanham Act)
provides for “actual damages and profits.”
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legislation, the only mention of attorney’s fees awards in the
legislative history of the ACPA is with respect to a trademark
plaintiff’s misrepresentation regarding domain name
infringement:
Under the amended bill, a trademark owner who
knowingly and materially misrepresents to the domain
name registrar or registry that a domain name is
infringing is liable to the domain name registrant for
damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, resulting
from the suspension, cancellation, or transfer of the
domain name. 168

In fact, when the ACPA was amended to replace the
original text with substitute legislation, Senator Abraham,
the ACPA’s original sponsor, neglected to mention that the
attorney’s fees provision would be omitted from the substitute
legislation, along with the original bill’s provision for criminal
penalties (which did, for some reason, warrant mention). 169
The omission of any substantive discussion of attorney’s
fees in the legislative history of the ACPA is, like all silences,
subject to interpretation. Notably, the legislative history of
subsection (c) is also silent on the matter of attorney’s fees.
Thus, again noting the similarity in the text of the two
sections, it would be reasonable to conclude either that (1)
Congress intended for attorney’s fees to be available alongside
statutory damages under both sections and did not feel the
need to include an express provision for attorney’s fees, given
the provision already included in subsection (a); or (2)
Congress did not intend for attorney’s fees to be available
alongside statutory damages under either section.
168. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 11 (1999). This provision is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(2)(D)(iv) (“If a registrar, registry, or other registration authority takes an
action described under clause (ii) based on a knowing and material
misrepresentation by any other person that a domain name is identical to,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a mark, the person making the knowing
and material misrepresentation shall be liable for any damages, including costs
and attorney’s fees, incurred by the domain name registrant as a result of such
action. The court may also grant injunctive relief to the domain name
registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or the transfer of the
domain name to the domain name registrant.”).
169. See Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
2 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham) (“A number of suggestions have
convinced me of the need for substitute legislation which addresses the issue of
in rem jurisdiction and which eliminate provisions dealing with criminal
penalties.”).
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First, the latter conclusion is at odds with Congress’s
express intention to allow defendants to recover attorney’s
fees where plaintiff trademark owners “overreach.”
Notwithstanding the special solicitude for potential
defendants subject to that overreach, including the clear
intention to provide them relief in the form of attorney’s fees,
it is nonsensical to assume that Congress meant to afford
greater relief to defendants fallen victim to plaintiffs’
overreach than to plaintiffs fallen victim to defendants’
trademark infringement.
Second, it is significant that from the very beginning the
ACPA was intended to “supplement[] existing rights under
trademark law,” 170 and the statutory damages provision that
would become subsection (d) was seen as an alternative to
actual damages and profits under then-existing subsection
(a). 171 Also, the ACPA was intended “to provide adequate
remedies for trademark owners” in cybersquatting cases, 172
allowing them to seek “traditional” remedies, such as
injunctions, actual damages, statutory damages, profits, and
costs. 173 Consistent not only with tradition, 174 but with
existing remedies available under the Lanham Act, both the
Senate and House reports made clear that “the creation of a
new section [defining and prohibiting cybersquatting] in the
Trademark Act does not in any way limit the application of
current provisions of trademark, unfair competition and false
advertising or dilution law, or other remedies under
counterfeiting or other statutes, to cybersquatting cases.” 175
Thus, given this legislative history background, it seems
that the Second Circuit’s reasoning as to Congress’s intent in
providing for statutory damages in trademark counterfeiting
cases in addition to attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases”
similarly applies to the statutory damages provision in
cybersquatting cases. In cybersquatting cases, just as in
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3 (“Finally, this [substitute] legislation provides for statutory civil
damages . . . The plaintiff may elect these damages in lieu of actual damages or
profits at any time before final judgment.”).
172. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 8 (1999).
173. Id. at 16; see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 15 (1999).
174. It should be noted that before the Court’s decision in Fleishmann,
“traditional” remedies for willful trademark infringement included attorney’s
fees. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
175. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 16 (1999); H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999).
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trademark counterfeiting cases, alleged cybersquatters are
presumably no more or less prone to keep accurate business
records that might form the basis of an actual damages or
profits award. Moreover, given the availability of injunctive
relief in cybersquatting cases, actual damages (including
treble damages) and profits may be very little, but attorney’s
fees could be substantial.
It is also clear that Congress intended to provide a host of
“traditional” remedies to trademark owners in cybersquatting
cases, so the notion that the election of statutory damages
instead of actual damages and profits forecloses the
availability of attorney’s fees “in exceptional cases” is
unsound, if not directly contrary to that intent.
The legislative history of subsection (a) also supports this
conclusion because, in exceptional cases, the court was
intended to have discretionary power to award equitable
remedies.
Additionally, the notion that attorney’s fees
awards are an additional, rather than alternative, remedy
and that their purpose is to assist in providing complete relief
are consistent with both the text and the legislative history of
subsection (d).
Consistent with the text and the legislative history of
both subsections (a) and (d), cybersquatting plaintiffs who
elect to receive statutory damages under the latter provision
should also be able to recover attorney’s fees under the former
in “exceptional cases.” But what is an “exceptional case” in
the context of the Lanham Act and who is the “exceptional
cybersquatter” in the specific context of the ACPA? This
paper now turns to a discussion of these questions and
advances a definition of the latter in an attempt to provide
more clarity to this narrow but confusing area of the law
governing damages in trademark cases.
III. WHO IS THE EXCEPTIONAL CYBERSQUATTER?
This part attempts to clarify when a defendant
cybersquatter whose “bad faith intent to profit” is established
under the ACPA 176 may be ordered by the court to pay the
176. This analysis assumes that the other elements of an ACPA violation—
plaintiff’s ownership of the mark and defendant’s registration, trafficking, or
use of a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to the mark; the
distinctiveness of the mark; and the inapplicability of the safe harbor
provisions—are satisfied. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (2012); Mamiya America
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plaintiff’s attorney’s fees upon a finding that the case is
exceptional. Again, the court’s discretionary power to award
attorney’s fees “in exceptional cases” is not implicated here,
because the threshold finding of “exceptionality” is not itself
discretionary and will be reviewed for clear error. 177 Thus,
although a “bad faith intent to profit” is necessary to a finding
of “exceptionality” that then permits a court to exercise its
discretion in making an attorney’s fees award to the plaintiff,
it is not sufficient to render a case “exceptional” given a
complete definition of that term.
Although this necessary/sufficient distinction may seem
obvious in some respect, several cases 178 where the distinction
has been both blurred and observed are useful in distilling
three key principles that together help to define “the
exceptional cybersquatter”: (1) “bad faith intent to profit”
alone does not make a case exceptional; (2) a cybersquatter’s
Corp. v. HuaYi Brothers, Inc., No. 09 CV 5501, 2011 WL 1322383, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011).
177. See, e.g., Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650
F.3d 423, 441 (4th Cir. 2011); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d
519, 528 (5th Cir. 2002). But see Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 636 F.3d 501, 505
(9th Cir. 2011) (“We . . . review de novo whether a trademark case is exceptional
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)”). The burden is on the party seeking an award of
attorney’s fees to establish that the case is “exceptional.” See, e.g., Schlotzsky’s,
Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & Nat’l Distrib. Co., Inc., 520 F.3d 393, 402 (5th Cir.
2008); Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 491 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The prevailing party bears the
burden of demonstrating the exceptional nature of the case by clear and
convincing evidence.”).
178. Many of the cases here were decided in the federal district courts and
although they represent only persuasive authority, the conduct of the trial
courts is important as many cybersquatting cases are adjudicated on motions
for default judgment where the factual allegations contained in the plaintiff’s
complaint are deemed admitted.
See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 8(b)(6) (“An
allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a
responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”); Prot. One
Alarm Monitoring, Inc. v. Exec. Prot. One Sec. Serv., LLC., 553 F. Supp. 2d 201,
207–08 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“In the Complaint, plaintiff alleges that Executive
Protection One’s use of the Protection One mark was willful. . . . As discussed
above, a default requires that the factual allegations in the complaint be
accepted as true and plaintiff plead the necessary facts for willful infringement.
Therefore, defendant’s violations are deemed willful and thus constitute
exceptional circumstances. An award of reasonable attorney’s fees is thus
appropriate.”). For obvious reasons, entries of default judgment are not often
appealed. Also, as discussed below, at least one circuit court of appeals
conflates the discretion to award attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” with the
discretion to decide whether cases are “exceptional” in the first instance. See,
Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 551 (6th Cir. 2006).
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litigation misconduct, that is, conduct separable from any
conduct violative of the Lanham Act or the ACPA, may make
a case exceptional; and (3) a cybersquatter’s willful conduct in
violation of the Lanham Act or the ACPA may also make a
case exceptional.
It should be noted that these three categories are not
neatly discrete or mutually exclusive, and that conduct
demonstrating “bad faith intent to profit” may also
demonstrate “willfulness,” in which case the cybersquatting is
“exceptional.” 179 Similarly, the facts of a particular case may
establish (1) “bad faith intent to profit,” (2) litigation conduct
that amounts to abuse of process, and (3) willfulness within
the meaning of the Lanham Act. 180 However, as many of the
cases below demonstrate, facts establishing “bad faith intent
to profit” and those found to make a case “exceptional” are too
often confused. In response, this paper attempts to offer a
classification that fully realizes the distinction between the
two standards in an attempt to define the truly “exceptional
cybersquatter.”
A. What is an “Exceptional Case”?
The attorney’s fees provision of the Lanham Act provides
that courts may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party “in exceptional cases.” Thus, for a party to
receive an attorney’s fees award, it must prevail, the case
must be “exceptional,” and the court must then exercise its
discretion to make such an award.
But what is an
“exceptional case”?
The “jumble” of case law defining “exceptional cases”
under the Lanham Act has received searching scrutiny by
both courts and commentators. 181 Confusion on this point

179. See Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs. Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th
Cir. 1997) (“ ‘ [B]ad faith of one of the parties may be part of those exceptional
circumstances’ warranting a fee award”) (alterations omitted).
180. See, e.g., Emp’rs Council On Flexible Comp. v. Feltman, 384 F. App’x
201, 207–08 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding “ample support” for the district court’s
determination that the defendants’ conduct was “exceptional” when they copied
plaintiff’s marks to “cause[] consternation in the ranks” and compete directly
against the plaintiff (“willful” conduct) and that one of the defendants
“conducted minimal legal research” on the trademark issues involved in the
case (litigation conduct)). See also discussion infra Part III.B.
181. See, e.g., Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC,
626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010); Leighton, supra note 50.
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comes from the lack of any definition in the Lanham Act itself
and the fact that the only definition provided in the
legislative history of the attorney’s fees provision of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a) is a brief but cryptic list of “descriptors”: an
exceptional case is one in which the defendant’s infringing
activity is “ ‘ malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or
‘willful.’ ” 182
Leighton opines that “the disjunctive form used by
Congress indicates that each of these descriptors is meant to
mean different things; on the other hand, Congress may have
been deliberately redundant to capture varying judicial
descriptors of the same type of activity.” 183 In either case,
many circuit courts of appeals define exceptionality by
including, either along with “ ‘ malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’
‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful,’ ” or independently of them, “bad faith”
conduct. In some jurisdictions, conduct that does not rise to
the level of “bad faith” is nonetheless sufficient to render a
case “exceptional.”
What follows is a brief survey of several Courts of
Appeals’ definitions of “exceptional cases” in and out of the
cybersquatting context that sets the stage for this paper’s
proposed definition of the “exceptional cybersquatter.” 184
In the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits, if the prevailing plaintiff
demonstrates that the defendant acted in “bad faith,” the case
may be, but is not necessarily, “exceptional” within the
182. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973); H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 1, 2 (1973); S.
REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1, 2 (1974).
183. Leighton, supra note 50 at 866–67.
184. Both Nightingale and Leighton collect and categorize cases based on
both the circuits’ definitions of “exceptional” and how that definition applies to a
“prevailing party,” whether plaintiff or defendant. Because the issue here—the
exceptionality of cybersquatters in cases where the bad faith of the defendant is
already established as a substantive requirement under the ACPA—is not
presented when a plaintiff engages in bad faith conduct (because there is no
“doubling down” on bad faith as an element of both the ACPA violation and
“exceptionality”), the collection and categorization here is simpler. Similarly,
the validity of “dual standards” for determining exceptionality under the
Lanham Act in light of Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (rejecting
the application of different standards to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing
defendants in determining the availability of attorney’s fees awards under the
Copyright Act) is beyond the scope of this paper. See Leighton, supra note 50 at
875–76.
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meaning of the Lanham Act. 185 Such a case is determined
exceptional and an award of attorney’s fees is permitted at
the discretion of the district court. 186 Addressing the meaning
of “exceptional cases” in the specific context of the ACPA, the
Fourth Circuit found that “a bad faith finding under the
ACPA does not compel a finding of malicious, fraudulent,
willful or deliberate behavior under section 1117.” 187 In
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 188 the
court concluded that “the district court was within its
discretion to find that, even though Doughney violated the
ACPA (and, thus, acted in bad faith), he did not act with the
level of malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior
necessary for an award of attorney fees.” 189
The Sixth Circuit appears to closely follow the legislative
history behind the Lanham Act’s attorney’s fees provision,

185. Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 221–22 (2d Cir.
2003) (“The Lanham Act authorizes the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing
parties in ‘exceptional cases,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), which we have understood to
mean instances of ‘fraud or bad faith.’ ” ) (citing Twin Peaks Productions v.
Publications International, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1383 (2d Cir. 1993)); Scotch
Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 594, 599 (4th Cir. 1991)
(stating that under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), a case is “exceptional” if the defendant’s
conduct was “malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate in nature” and that a
prevailing plaintiff must “show that the defendant acted in bad faith”); Tex. Pig
Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 697 (5th Cir. 1992);
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2002); Nat’l
Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d
1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs,
Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1169 (11th Cir. 1982); Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v.
Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Under the
Lanham Act, a court must find willful or bad faith infringement by the
defendant in order to award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.”).
186. Patsy’s Brand, 317 F.3d at 221–22 (“The Lanham Act authorizes the
award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in ‘exceptional cases,’ 15 U.S.C. §
1117(a), which we have understood to mean instances of ‘fraud or bad faith’ ”)
(citing Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1383); Scotch Whisky, 958 F.2d at 599 (stating
that under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), a case is “exceptional” if the defendant’s conduct
was “malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate in nature” and that a prevailing
plaintiff must “show that the defendant acted in bad faith”); Tex. Pig
Stands, 951 F.2d at 697; Procter & Gamble, 280 F.3d at 526; Prof’l Baseball
Leagues, 223 F.3d at 1147; Safeway Stores, 675 F.2d at 1169; Reader’s Digest,
821 F.2d at 808 (“Under the Lanham Act, a court must find willful or bad faith
infringement by the defendant in order to award attorney’s fees to the
plaintiff.”).
187. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 370
(4th Cir. 2001).
188. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359.
189. Id. at 370.
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eschewing the inclusion of “bad faith” along with “‘malicious,’
‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful’” in its general definition
of “exceptional.” 190 However, the Sixth Circuit is unique
among all of the federal courts of appeals—it explicitly
suggested all cybersquatting cases may be “exceptional” by
stating that “[a] finding of bad faith under the ACPA does not
necessarily compel a court to find ‘malicious, fraudulent,
willful or deliberate’ conduct. However, a court would be well
within its discretion in determining that bad faith under the
ACPA supports finding such conduct.” 191
This statement is remarkable in its lack of qualification.
As I argue below, a court would not be “well within its
discretion in determining that bad faith under the ACPA
supports a finding” of “malicious, fraudulent, willful, or
deliberate” conduct in the absence of conduct in some way
separable from that which establishes bad faith intent under
the ACPA; otherwise, all ACPA cases are “exceptional” (which
also means none of them are). Further, the determination
that a case is “exceptional” based on a finding of “malicious,
fraudulent, willful, or deliberate” conduct is not discretionary,
it is a factual determination reviewed for clear error. Instead,
it is the award of attorney’s fees once a case has been
determined to be “exceptional” that is discretionary.
However, to the extent that the Sixth Circuit recognizes
conduct may establish both “bad faith intent to profit” and
exceptionality, the conclusion is correct but relies on an
incomplete and misleading statement of the law.
Uniquely, the Seventh Circuit appears to equate
“exceptionality” with a broad definition of “abuse of
process.” 192 Under this theory, a defendant who “insist[s] on
mounting a costly defense” is indistinguishable from a
plaintiff who brings a trademark infringement case “not in
order to obtain a favorable judgment, but instead to burden
the defendant with costs likely to drive it out of the

190. Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 2004) (“the
term “exceptional” is not defined in the statute, although a case is not
exceptional unless ‘the infringement was malicious, fraudulent, willful, or
deliberate.’ ”) (quoting Hindu Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir.
1982)).
191. Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 551 (6th Cir. 2006).
192. Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d
958, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2010).
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market.” 193 Thus, a showing that a defense is “objectively
unreasonable,” in the sense that it was meant to “impose
disproportionate costs” on the plaintiff, is sufficient to show
the case is “exceptional.” 194
The First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits do not
require a showing of “bad faith” in order for a case to be
exceptional. 195 “Willfulness short of bad faith” and mere
“culpable conduct” (including bad faith, fraud, malice, and
knowing infringement) are sufficient in the First, Third, and
Eighth circuits to render a case exceptional, and the Ninth
Circuit expressly does not require a showing of bad faith. 196
The Third Circuit has also separately addressed the
meaning of “exceptional” in the cybersquatting context. In
Shields v. Zuccarini, 197 a case decided shortly after the
enactment of the ACPA, the district court made the requisite
finding of culpable conduct when it determined that the
defendant “acted willfully and in bad faith when he registered
. . . domain names in an effort to confuse people and to divert

193. Id. at 963.
194. Id. at 965.
195. Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.
2002) (“willfulness short of bad faith or fraud will suffice when equitable
considerations justify an award and the district court supportably finds the case
exceptional”); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 47–48 (3d
Cir. 1991) (“a district court must make a finding of culpable conduct on the part
of the losing party, such as bad faith, fraud, malice, or knowing infringement,
before a case qualifies as ‘exceptional.’ ”); Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v.
Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (under the Lanham Act,
attorney’s fees are available in “exceptional cases” which involve culpable
conduct, such as “bad faith, fraud, malice, or knowing infringement.”) (citing
Ferrero, 952 F.2d 44); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 123 (8th
Cir. 1987) (“Bad faith is not a prerequisite to a Lanham Act fee award.”); Cmty.
of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Devon Park Restoration Branch of Jesus Christ’s
Church, 634 F.3d 1005, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that a district court is
not “required to find the existence of bad faith before it could deem the case
exceptional.”); Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821,
827 (9th Cir. 1997); Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 615–16
(9th Cir. 2010).
196. Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 101 (3d Cir. 2007) (“the term
‘exceptional’ is not, as the plaintiff seems to suggest, a throwaway. Rather, it
calls for a district court to determine whether it finds a defendant’s conduct
particularly culpable—enough to alter the general American rule that parties to
litigation pay their own attorneys’ fees.”); see also Tamko, 282 F.3d 23; Ferrero,
952 F.2d 44; Securacom, 224 F.3d 273; Hartman, 833 F.2d 117; Cmty. of Christ,
634 F.3d 1005; Boney, 127 F.3d 821; Love, 611 F.3d 601.
197. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 487 (3d Cir. 2001).
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Internet traffic to his web sites for his own economic gain.” 198
The district court also found that the defendant “conducted no
bona fide business related to [plaintiff’s mark] and that he
had no basis on which to believe his use of the domain names
was fair and lawful.” 199 Further, the district court found the
defendant’s conduct to be “particularly flagrant” based on his
registration of 1,644 domain names during the course of the
pending litigation and noted that defendant “showed no
remorse for his actions.” 200
The Third Circuit noted that although “bad faith” was “a
threshold finding for any violation of the ACPA . . . the
district court made a proper finding that, under the
circumstances, this case qualified as ‘exceptional’ and merited
the award of attorney’s fees under § 1117(a).” 201 Significantly,
the court of appeals explicitly reserved the question of
“whether the finding of ‘bad faith’ under [the ACPA]
automatically warrants an award of attorney’s fees under §
1117(a) and the case law that has interpreted that
provision.” 202
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has found that willful
conduct and a pattern or practice of cybersquatting, as well as
“abusive litigation practices” in the course of cybersquatting
litigation, can render a case “exceptional.” In Lahoti v.
Vericheck, Inc., 203 the district court found that the defendant
not only willfully registered a domain name substantially
similar to plaintiff’s mark, “attempt[ed] to extort thousands of
dollars” from plaintiff, and disregarded plaintiff’s trademark
rights, he also engaged in a pattern and practice of
cybersquatting and a pattern and practice of “abusive
litigation practices,” including “the submission of inaccurate
answers to interrogatories.” 204
Of course, attorney’s fees awards under section 1117(a)
are not mandatory, as they are under section 1117(b). Thus,
a successful plaintiff in a cybersquatting case, having
established “bad faith intent to profit,” can still be denied an

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 487 n.7.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 487 n.6.
Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 636 F.3d 501, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
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award of attorney’s fees in the district court’s discretion even
if the court is bound by circuit precedent acknowledging that
bad faith may serve as a prerequisite to such an award. 205
However, as Leighton points out, “the determination of
exceptionality under Lanham Act Section 35(a) is a two-step
analysis, the first step of which entails an objective inquiry
that applies the statutory intent and related case law to the
relevant facts as a precondition to the second step, namely,
exercising the discretionary authority granted in the
section . . . the initial inquiry is not, in itself, a discretionary
act.” 206 Thus, “focusing on discretion begs the question of how
a trial court should determine whether the case before it is an
‘exceptional’ one in which to exercise such discretion.” 207 This
distinction is important because the discretionary grant is
necessarily limited. Just as it would be inappropriate for a
district court to award attorney’s fees in a case that was not
exceptional, 208 it would similarly be inappropriate for a
district court not to award attorney’s fees in a case that was
patently exceptional given Congress’s intent to provide
205. See, e.g., People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d
359, 370 (4th Cir. 2001) (“a bad faith finding under the ACPA does not compel a
finding of malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior under § 1117.
The district court was within its discretion to find that, even though [the
defendant] violated the ACPA (and, thus, acted in bad faith), he did not act with
the level of malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior necessary for an
award of attorney fees.”); Mister Softee of Brooklyn, Inc. v. Boula Vending Inc.,
484 F. App'x 623, 624 (2d Cir. 2012) (“While we have said that a finding of
willfulness, fraud, or bad faith is a ‘prerequisite’ to finding a case ‘sufficiently
“exceptional” to warrant an award of fees’ under section 1117(a) . . . we have
never held that a finding of willfulness, fraud, or bad faith automatically
requires an award of fees under that section.”) (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier
S.A. v. Ly USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 108–09 (2d Cir. 2012)).
206. Leighton, supra note 50, at 866; see also Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d
100, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Determining whether a case is exceptional is a twostep process. First, the District Court must decide whether the defendant
engaged in any culpable conduct. We have listed bad faith, fraud, malice, and
knowing infringement as non-exclusive examples of the sort of culpable conduct
that could support a fee award. Moreover, the culpable conduct may relate not
only to the circumstances of the Lanham Act violation, but also to the way the
losing party handled himself during the litigation. Second, if the District Court
finds culpable conduct, it must decide whether the circumstances are
“exceptional” enough to warrant a fee award. In sum, a district court may not
award fees without a finding of culpable conduct, but it may decline to award
them despite a finding of culpable conduct based on the totality of the
circumstances.”) (citations omitted).
207. Leighton, supra note 50, at 866.
208. Id.
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complete relief for trademark owners under the various
provisions of the Lanham Act.
B. The Exceptional Cybersquatter Defined
This paper argues that defining the “exceptional
cybersquatter” requires a principled distinction between what
facts demonstrate “bad faith intent to profit” (that is, facts
that define a “cybersquatter”) under the ACPA and what facts
are sufficient to render a case “exceptional” under the
Lanham Act. Although it is important to recognize that the
two inquiries can involve the same facts, all too often courts
analyze those facts under one standard (“bad faith intent to
profit”) and then assume the application of the other
(“exceptional cases”). This paper argues that that assumption
is clearly erroneous, and that for any cybersquatting case to
be truly “exceptional,” in addition to a finding that there is
bad faith intent to profit, there must also be a finding that
the defendant either engaged in conduct during the course of
litigation that warrants the exercise of the discretion to
award attorney’s fees or engaged in conduct that qualifies as
“willful” within the meaning of the Lanham Act.
Critically, the definition of the exceptional cybersquatter
proposed here—“bad faith intent to profit” plus extraordinary
litigation or infringement conduct—does not apply to cases
that merely involve claims of cybersquatting. Defining the
exceptional cybersquatter as such is different than defining
exceptional cybersquatting cases.
Thus, a case where
attorney’s fees are sought against a defendant whose
cybersquatting counterclaim is allegedly meritless is beyond
the scope of this paper because the alleged cybersquatter in
that case—the plaintiff—is the party seeking attorney’s fees
rather than the party against whom attorney’s fees are
sought. 209 In this scenario, there is no need to define the
exceptional cybersquatter because it is not the alleged
cybersquatter (the plaintiff) whose “exceptional” conduct is at
issue; it is the defendant’s litigation conduct that warrants an
attorney’s fees award.
209. See AirFX.com v. AirFX, LLC, No. CV 11-01064-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL
857976, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2013) (“because we find that defendant’s
counterclaims [for trademark infringement and cybersquatting] were
groundless and unreasonable, we conclude that this case is exceptional within
the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)”).
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1. Facts Underlying the Determination of “Bad Faith
Intent to Profit” Alone Do Not Make a Case
Exceptional
At the outset, bad faith generally (as distinguishable
from “bad faith intent to profit”) cannot support the
determination that a case is “exceptional” for two reasons.
First, there is no support for the use of “bad faith” as a
descriptor for exceptional conduct in the legislative history of
the Lanham Act’s attorney’s fees provision—the two words
are never used, either in conjunction with or independent of
the often-repeated definition of “exceptional cases,” that is,
those exhibiting “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful”
conduct. 210 Second, as Leighton notes and the cases surveyed
here demonstrate, “bad faith” is not capable of a precise
definition and is therefore understandably defined and
applied inconsistently by the courts. 211 This paper argues
that generalized bad faith as a judicially-created, amorphous
descriptor of “exceptional” conduct is entirely at odds with the
text, intent, and purpose of both the Lanham Act’s attorney’s
fees provision and the ACPA, and should not be used in
determining what cases brought under the latter are
“exceptional.”
As noted above, the ACPA includes nine factors to guide
courts in determining the existence of “bad faith intent to
profit,” one of the essential elements of a cybersquatting
claim.
The factors are permissive and in “unique
circumstances,” courts are permitted to go beyond the factors
to examine the facts of a case as a whole in deciding whether
210. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 1, 2 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1,
2 (1974); Leighton, supra note 50, at 881 (“The term ‘bad faith’ . . . does not
appear (as such) in the statute or its legislative history.”).
211. Leighton, supra note 50, at 881 (“In Lanham Act cases (and elsewhere),
‘bad faith’ invariably is unexplained, or explained by case-specific illustration
only, rather than being the subject of a generally recognized definition. In
decisions that interpret the exceptional cases provision, the ‘bad faith’
descriptor is viewed inconsistently among the federal circuits. Thus, for
example, some courts simply require a demonstration of ‘willfulness or bad
faith,’ indicating that the terms are different but of equal culpability when
applied to an action. Some indicate that bad faith is of greater culpability than
willfulness alone. Some state that ‘willful’ and ‘bad faith’ are to be regarded
merely as synonyms.”) (citing Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest,
Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 808–09 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal
Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 2002); Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc.
v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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an alleged cybersquatter has the requisite intent. 212
The first task in defining the “exceptional cybersquatter”
is clearly defining what he is not—a mere cybersquatter. In
other words, facts supporting a finding of “bad faith intent to
profit” alone are insufficient to also support a finding that a
case is exceptional. Otherwise, all cybersquatting cases
would be exceptional, and the extraordinary, exceptional
relief provided for in the Lanham Act’s attorney’s fees
provision would cease to be either extraordinary or
exceptional in all cases brought under the ACPA. As there is
no evidence whatsoever in the text or the legislative history of
the ACPA or the Lanham Act justifying such a result, courts
must be careful to distinguish cases involving “run of the
mine” cybersquatters from cases involving truly exceptional
cybersquatters.
Although making this distinction is
seemingly intuitive, it appears to be difficult in practice.
One of the most recent cases to expressly address the
issue of “exceptionality” in cases where defendant’s bad faith
is already established as an element of plaintiff’s
cybersquatting claim is ForeWord Magazine, Inc. v.
OverDrive, Inc. 213 The plaintiff in ForeWord, a provider of
book review services and publisher of a magazine called
Foreword Reviews, owned the trademarks FOREWORD and
FOREWORD REVIEWS. 214 It entered into an agreement
with defendant, an e-book software provider, to develop,
With the
distribute, and sell on-line book reviews. 215
plaintiff’s consent, defendant registered the domain names
forewordreviews.com and, to “head off consumer confusion
from misspellings,” forwardreviews.com. 216
The parties’ joint venture ended acrimoniously, and as
part of a settlement agreement, defendant agreed to transfer
Defendant retained
forewordreviews.com to plaintiff. 217
forwardreviews.com, which was not included in the parties’
settlement agreement, and for several years the domain name
went unused until defendant rerouted Internet traffic from it
212. See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt. Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir.
2000); Gioconda Law Grp. PLLC v. Kenzie, 941 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
213. ForeWord Magazine, Inc. v. OverDrive, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-01144, 2013
WL 140195 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2013).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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to its own website. 218
When plaintiff learned that
forwardreviews.com was still in use and directing traffic to
defendant’s website, the parties entered into discussions
regarding the domain name’s transfer. 219 At one point,
defendant offered to transfer forwardreviews.com to plaintiff
in exchange for a $2,500 donation to charity. 220 Plaintiff
rejected this offer and threatened to sue defendant if the
domain name was not transferred. 221 Defendant’s CEO
responded to this threat by temporarily rerouting traffic to
forwardreviews.com to the website of Forward, a Jewish daily
newspaper. 222 Plaintiff later brought cybersquatting, unfair
competition, and breach of contract claims against defendant
under the ACPA and Michigan state law. 223 On summary
judgment, the court found in favor of the plaintiff on its
cybersquatting claim, and after trial it turned to the issue of
attorney’s fees. 224
The court began its analysis of the attorney’s fees issue
by revisiting its decision, on summary judgment, that
defendant had acted in bad faith “as an element of [plaintiff’s]
cybersquatting claim.” 225 Citing Sixth Circuit precedent, the
court stated that a case is not “exceptional” under the
Lanham Act unless the infringement at issue is “malicious,
fraudulent, willful, or deliberate,” but that a finding of bad
faith under the ACPA was sufficient to support a
determination that a case is “exceptional” and justify an
award of attorney’s fees. 226 The court’s findings on summary
judgment, however, went “further.” 227 Specifically, the court
reached the “inescapable conclusion” that defendant acted in
bad faith because of its:
(1) Registration of a confusingly similar domain name for
purposes of its joint venture with plaintiff (“to head off
consumer confusion from misspellings”);

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. (The court ultimately ordered transfer of the domain name
forwardreviews.com to plaintiff, in addition to attorney’s fees under the ACPA).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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(2) Failure to use the confusingly similar domain name for
any legitimate business following the dissolution of the
joint venture;
(3) Re-routing of visitors to its own site, using the
“overlap” between the two companies’ “somewhat different
products and services” in “an attempt to increase
[defendant’s] own business using [plaintiff’s] unwitting,
potential” customers;
(4) Re-routing of visitors to “forward.com” with “an intent
to confuse [plaintiff’s] potential customers by linking the
book-review company to a Jewish daily newspaper”;
(5) “[R]efusal to simply give the [confusingly similar]
domain name to [plaintiff] in exchange for its registration
costs, even though it had no real connection to and no
legitimate use for the domain name” [a refusal the court
stated “smacks of bad faith”];
(6) Offer to transfer the confusingly similar domain name
“in exchange for a $2,500 donation to a charity associated
with [defendant’s] CEO”; and
(7) Refusal “to return the domain name not out of any
legitimate business purpose, nor based on any reasonable
legal arguments that it was not in fact violating the law”
but as “ ‘a matter of principle’ . . . opposing [plaintiff] at
every turn.”228

Each of these findings “maps” onto factors set out in the
ACPA for consideration in determining bad faith intent to
profit. First, (7) “the lack of any reasonable legal arguments
that [defendant] was not in fact violating the law” suggests
that defendant had no trademark or other intellectual
property rights in the domain name—the first ACPA bad
faith intent factor. 229 Similarly, defendant had never used the
domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any

228. Id.
229. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(I) (2012) (“In determining whether a person
has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to . . . the trademark or other intellectual
property rights of the person, if any, in the domain name.”). Lack of reasonable
arguments that a defendant is not in fact in violation of the ACPA also suggest
that the safe harbor provisions of the ACPA do not apply and, possibly, that
defendant engaged in the kind of “abuse of process” that the court in
Nightingale found sufficient to render a case “exceptional.” See Nightingale
Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958, 963–65 (7th
Cir. 2010).
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goods or services ((2), ACPA factor three 230) and later,
following the dissolution of the parties’ joint business venture,
defendant intentionally diverted plaintiff’s “unwitting,
potential” customers in an attempt to confuse them and
increase its business ((3) and (4), ACPA factor five 231).
Defendant also offered to transfer or sell the domain name to
plaintiff for financial gain without having used it in
commerce itself ((5) and (6), ACPA factor six 232) and acquired
the domain name in the first instance, as the court points out,
knowing that it was confusingly similar to plaintiff’s
trademark ((1), ACPA factor eight 233).
Addressing defendant’s arguments that attorney’s fees
were improper, including the simplicity of the case, plaintiff’s
lack of actual damages, and defendant’s efforts to settle the
matter, the court stated that:
[I]f anything, the simplicity of this case cuts against
[defendant], which continued to refuse to transfer the
name to [plaintiff] even after the issues and relevant law
became clear. The lack of actual damages, for its part, is
also not a reason to find this case unexceptional . . . [and]
attempts to settle a case cannot excuse the willful and
230. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(III) (“In determining whether a person has a
bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to . . . the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name
in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services.”).
231. Id. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(V) (“In determining whether a person has a bad faith
intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as,
but not limited to . . . the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner’s online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could
harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with
the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion
as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site.”).
232. Id. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(VI) (“In determining whether a person has a bad faith
intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as,
but not limited to . . . the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide
offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a
pattern of such conduct.”).
233. Id. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(VIII) (“In determining whether a person has a bad
faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to . . . the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to
marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain
names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of
registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of
the parties.”).
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deliberate infringement that made the case necessary in
the first place.

Based on these facts and this reasoning, the court
concluded that the case was “exceptional” and awarded
attorney’s fees.
This case is illustrative of the line-drawing problem
inherent in defining the exceptional cybersquatter. Where
does conduct that “smacks of bad faith” for purposes of
determining cybersquatter liability under the ACPA cross the
line and become “malicious, fraudulent, willful, or deliberate”
for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees under the Lanham
Act? From this perspective, the court’s analysis in this case is
at least confusing and at most critically flawed. 234
First, the court’s statement that a finding of bad faith is
sufficient to render a case exceptional, although consistent
with Sixth Circuit precedent, is incorrect. If that were true,
all cybersquatting cases would be exceptional, and thus none
would be. Further, even assuming the intellectual validity of
such a proposition, findings of exceptionality are fact findings
reviewed for clear error, although awards of attorney’s fees
“in exceptional cases” are discretionary and reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Thus, the deferentially-reviewed decision
to award attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the court
only after the court has correctly determined, as a factual
matter, that the case is “exceptional.” 235
Given precedent permitting confusion of the two
standards, it is understandable but still remarkable for the
purposes of this paper that the court determines the case is
“exceptional” by looking at facts that map onto factors set out
in the ACPA for consideration in determining bad faith intent
234. For another, similar Sixth Circuit decision, see HER, Inc. v. Re/Max
First Choice, LLC, No. C2-06-492, 2011 WL 6019438 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2011).
As in ForeWord, the facts the HER court uses to justify its “exceptionality”
determination map onto factors Congress set out for courts to consider in
determining whether bad faith intent exists under the ACPA. See also
Citigroup, Inc. v. Chen Bao Shui, 611 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512–13 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(methodically analyzing the facts of the case according to the bad faith intent
elements listed in the ACPA and concluding that the plaintiff had established
the defendant’s ACPA violation, but merely stating that “Defendant’s violative
use has been established as sufficiently willful, deliberate, and performed in bad
faith to merit the maximum statutory award of $100,000 and an award of
attorneys’ fees.”).
235. See, e.g., K.S.R. X-Ray Supplies, Inc. v. Se. X-Ray, Inc., No. 09-81454CIV, 2010 WL 4317026 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2010).
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to profit. Although it may be that the court relied implicitly
on defendant’s “spitefulness” in determining that its
infringement in this case was “willful and deliberate” and
thus “exceptional,” the overwhelming weight of the reasoning
in the opinion combined with the misstatement of the
relevant standard at the head of the court’s discussion
strongly indicates that the behavior here is indicative of
nothing more than “bad faith intent to profit” and that the
defendant is therefore no more than a cybersquatter as
defined in the ACPA.
This overlapping, misapplication of the two standards—
“bad faith intent to profit” and “exceptional cases”—is not
uncommon and, as ForeWord shows, not unique to cases
where attorney’s fees requests (or liability under the ACPA)
are uncontested. 236 However, for the two standards to remain
distinct, analysis like that in ForeWord—analysis that relies
on the same facts to determine “bad faith intent to profit” and
exceptionality without recognizing the distinction between
the two—must be avoided.
2. Litigation Conduct May Make a Cybersquatter
Exceptional
Notwithstanding the potential overlap between
definitions of “bad faith intent to profit” and malicious,
fraudulent, deliberate, and willful conduct generally, there
are cases where defendants’ conduct in the course of litigation
itself goes beyond the elements of “bad faith intent to profit”
and courts recognizing this conduct appropriately and
justifiably use it as a foundation for a finding of
exceptionality. This litigation conduct generally takes two
forms: a pattern or practice of abusive discovery or litigation

236. See, e.g., Two Plus Two Pub., LLC v. Boyd, No. 2:09-CV-02318-KJD,
2012 WL 724678 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2012) (analyzing bad faith intent under the
ACPA factors and summarily finding defendant’s conduct willful without
reference to facts not included in that analysis). Even in uncontested cases,
where willfulness is inferred from a defendant’s failure to appear, some courts
still fail to distinguish between bad faith intent and exceptional conduct in their
analyses. See, e.g., Nucal Foods, Inc. v. Kaye, No. 2:12-CV-2754 KJM AC, 2013
WL 1680643 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2013) (concluding that “because the defendant’s
conduct can be deemed willful and deceptive in light of his failure to defend this
action, in combination with his demand for payment [ACPA factor six], plaintiff
is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.”) (emphasis added); City of Carlsbad v.
Shah, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
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conduct and default, or the failure to defend.
A pattern or practice of abusive discovery or litigation
conduct is often the basis for courts’ findings of an
“exceptional” case where attorney’s fees awards may be
appropriate. For instance, in City of Carlsbad v. Shah, 237 the
district court determined “bad faith intent to profit” from a
series of stipulated facts, then went on to find that
defendant’s “infringement was malicious, fraudulent,
deliberate and willful.” 238
Shah knowingly, intentionally and deliberately adopted
and used the City’s Marks in order to cause confusion.
Shah has persisted in using the City’s Logo in connection
with his business enterprise even after the summary
judgment ruling that established the City’s rights in the
Marks and the Logo. Shah has no good faith basis for
refuting the City’s ownership of the Marks and Logo, and
his arguments and behavior throughout this case have
been groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, and pursued in
bad faith. 239

The use of affirmative litigation behavior as a foundation
for any “exceptional case” determination is not only consistent
with a principled separation of the “bad faith intent to profit”
and “exceptional” standards, but also with the Seventh
Circuit’s attempt to standardize the definition of the
“exceptional case” generally. In Nightingale, Judge Posner
asserted that “a case under the Lanham Act is ‘exceptional,’
in the sense of warranting an award of reasonable attorney’s
237. Shah, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 1108–09.
238. Id.
239. Id. (emphasis added); see also Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 636 F.3d 501,
510–11 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that defendant’s infringement was willful
because he knowingly registered plaintiff’s mark as a website address, tried to
extort thousands of dollars from the plaintiff, had a pattern and practice of
cybersquatting, and had a pattern of abusive discovery and litigation conduct);
Mine O’Mine, Inc. v. Calmese, No. 2:10-CV-00043-KJD, 2012 WL 1279827, at *3
(D. Nev. Apr. 16, 2012), aff’d, 489 F. App’x 175 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that in
previous cases, defendant “demonstrated a habit of disregarding courtesy to
opposing counsel, unscrupulous conduct relating to settlement, wasteful
litigation practices, and unwillingness to follow court orders,” and that in the
instant case, his “sleight of hand tactics in settlement negotiations, backsliding
on an agreement for an extension, dilatory conduct in relation to depositions,
and unwillingness to respect [the court’s] instructions on filing discovery
motions . . . create[d] inconvenience and waste which negatively affect[ed]
opposing parties, the Court, and litigants in other cases with meritorious
claims”).
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fees to the winning party, if the losing party was the . . .
defendant and had no defense yet persisted in the trademark
infringement or false advertising for which he was being
sued, in order to impose costs on his opponent.” 240
Far from being an abstraction, this “abuse of process”
rationale usefully distinguishes between infringing behavior
underlying a substantive violation of a trademark right (like
cybersquatting) and behavior following the establishment of
that violation whose only significance is in determining
whether the case is otherwise “exceptional.” This distinction
between behavior that violates the Lanham Act and
“exceptional” behavior in the course of litigation is moreover
consistent with the express purpose of the attorney’s fees
provision in the Lanham Act: making “a trademark owner’s
remedy complete in enforcing his mark against willful
infringers.” 241 After all, a complete remedy cannot be afforded
in a case where the infringer acts willfully both in the act of
infringement and during the course of litigation to establish
and remedy that infringement. In the latter case, the
defendant is imposing additional costs on the plaintiff that
are over and above the costs incurred because of the
substantive trademark violation itself.
In other cases, the court engages in a factor-by-factor
“bad faith intent to profit” analysis and similarly finds that
defendant’s litigation behavior (or non-behavior) sets that
case apart as “exceptional.” In Mamiya Am. Corp. v. HuaYi
Bros., Inc., 242 following entry of default judgment, the court
first observed that the defendant did not possess any
trademark or intellectual property rights in the disputed
domain name (ACPA factor one), the domain name did not
consist of the legal name of its owner, the defendant (ACPA
factor two), and that the defendant did not make fair or
240. Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d
958, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2010); see also AirFX.com v. AirFX, LLC, No. CV 1101064-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 857976 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2013) (“However, we are
not persuaded that defendant or defendant’s counsel acted in bad faith.
Nevertheless, because we find that defendant’s counterclaims were groundless
and unreasonable, we conclude that this case is exceptional within the meaning
of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).”).
241. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 6 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (1974).
242. Mamiya Am. Corp. v. HuaYi Bros., Inc., 09-CV-5501 ENV JO, 2011 WL
1322383 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011), adopted by No. 09-CV-5501 ENV JO, 2011
WL 1253748 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011).
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noncommercial use of the plaintiff’s marks on its site (ACPA
factor four). 243 In determining the appropriate amount of
statutory damages to award, the court noted that defendant’s
“failure to participate in this action also establishes
Regarding an “exceptional” award of
willfulness.” 244
attorney’s fees, the court concluded that given the facts of the
case and its posture, plaintiff had established that
defendant’s infringement was “both in bad faith and willful”
and recommended an award of attorney’s fees. 245
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. (emphasis added); see also Punch Clock, Inc. v. Smart Software Dev.,
553 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358–59 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“Plaintiff has established the
Defendant’s bad faith intent to profit though its well-pleaded allegations of
SSD’s intent to divert consumers of time keeping software away from PCI with
the use of the accused domain name, bolstered by the evidence of its ongoing
willful infringement of the trademark. . . . Given the bad faith and willful
nature of the violation, the Court finds such an ‘exceptional’ case here and
concludes that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is warranted.”);
Ticketmaster Corp. v. DeVane, No. 7:07-CV-196-F, 2008 WL 2073914 (E.D.N.C.
May 14, 2008) (finding that defendant’s continued use of plaintiff’s marks after
receiving a cease and desist letter and failure to appear rendered the case
exceptional); Taverna Opa Trademark Corp. v. Ismail, No. 08-20776-CIV, 2010
WL 1838384, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2010) (stating that the court was “satisfied
that the deliberate and willful conduct by [defendant], her concealing her
whereabouts, and her failure to defend this lawsuit substantiates Taverna
Opa’s claim for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).”);
Nucal Foods, Inc. v. Kaye, No. 2:12-CV-2754 KJM AC, 2013 WL 1680643, at *7
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2013) (“Willful infringement occurs when the defendant
knowingly and intentionally infringes on a trademark. Willfulness can also be
inferred from a defendant’s failure to defend. Here, because the defendant’s
conduct can be deemed willful and deceptive in light of his failure to defend this
action, in combination with his demand for payment, plaintiff is entitled to an
award of attorneys’ fees.”) (citations omitted); Study Logic, LLC v. Clear Net
Plus, Inc., No. 11 CV 4343 CLP, 2012 WL 4329349, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
2012) (“willful infringement may be established by virtue of a defendant’s
default”) (citing Kenneth Jay Lane v. Heavenly Apparel, Inc., No. 03 CV 2132,
2006 WL 728407, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2006)); eAdGear, Inc. v. Liu, CV-1105398 JCS, 2012 WL 2367805, at *19 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2012), adopted by No.
C-11-05398 RMW JCS, 2012 WL 4005454 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012)
(“Willfulness can also be inferred from a defendant’s failure to defend.”) (citing
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal.
2003)). But see United Air Lines, Inc. v. unitedair.com, No. 1:12CV0143
GBL/JFA, 2012 WL 2838629, at *7 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2012), adopted by, No.
1:12CV143 GBL/JFA, 2012 WL 2838569 (E.D. Va. July 9, 2012) (“It would be
illogical to find that a failure to appear in an in rem proceeding under the ACPA
may form an independent basis for an award of attorney’s fees under the
Lanham Act-to do so would convert all unanswered ACPA claims (which are in
no way exceptional) into ‘exceptional’ cases.”).
It is worth noting that, given the discretionary nature of attorney’s fees
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These cases demonstrate that behavior beyond “bad faith
intent to profit” in the context of the cybersquatting litigation
itself can and should be sufficient to render a case
“exceptional.” 246 This behavior is not willful within the
meaning of the Lanham Act, as it is not part of a substantive
violation of any trademark right, including rights protected
by the ACPA. Nevertheless, the behavior is “exceptional” and
attorney’s fees may therefore be appropriate to afford
complete relief to a cybersquatting plaintiff as the plaintiff
may expend resources in vindicating those rights that she
would not if the defendant did not engage in such behavior.
This paper now turns to the second and final definition of the
“exceptional cybersquatter”—one who acts willfully within
the meaning of the Lanham Act.
3. Willful Cybersquatters are Exceptional
Cybersquatters
If a defendant does not default, a cybersquatting plaintiff
may still be entitled to attorney’s fees if the court believes the
cybersquatting conduct was willful and thus exceptional.
Because a defendant in default admits all of the factual
allegations in the complaint, 247 even a court unwilling to
consider defendant’s failure to defend as “exceptional”
conduct would be hard pressed to ignore allegations that
defendant’s infringement was willful. 248
awards in “exceptional” cases, including those where the exceptional conduct is
confined to defendant’s failure to appear, default does not always automatically
trigger an award of attorney’s fees. See Area 55, Inc. v. Pandamerican LLC, No.
10-CV-269-H NLS, 2010 WL 3564715, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010) (“Based
on allegations by the Plaintiff of Defendants’ violations of the ACPA as well as
allegations that Defendants deliberately used Area 55’s marks to distract and
divert Area 55’s marks to distract and divert consumers to their website and
banner advertisements, the Court holds that Plaintiff is entitled to costs. The
Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees.”).
246. Accord Leighton, supra note 50, at 881 (“Under Lanham Act subsection
35(a), a district court may use its discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees
to the prevailing party only in ‘exceptional cases’ brought under the Act.
‘Exceptional cases’ within the meaning of that subsection are limited to . . .
cases in which the defendant’s violation of the Act was not willful, but in which
defendant willfully pursued an unfounded defense during the litigation to harm
the plaintiff, as shown by objectively considering the defendant’s pleadings and
litigation activities”).
247. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to
the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and
the allegation is not denied”).
248. See, e.g., Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072,

CUMBY FINAL

2014]

5/23/2014 12:41 PM

THE EXCEPTIONAL CYBERSQUATTER

361

In contested cases, willfulness under the Lanham Act,
that is, willfulness in the context of the substantive body of
trademark law, is not only appropriately distinguishable from
the substantive definition of a violation of the ACPA
(including the “bad faith intent to profit” element) and thus a
valid justification for determining that a case is
“exceptional,” 249 but an expressly recognized basis for such a
finding given the legislative history of the Lanham Act’s
attorney’s fees provision. Both the House and Senate reports
on subsection (a) stressed that attorney’s fees awards in
“exceptional” cases “would make a trademark owner’s remedy
complete in enforcing his mark against willful infringers.” 250
Further, as Leighton points out, “willfulness” includes
“malicious, fraudulent, and deliberate” behavior such that
Congress’s definition of the “exceptional case” and a definition
of the “exceptional cybersquatter” that depends first on a
finding of willfulness is also consistent with Congress’s
understanding of that term. 251
Unlike the ACPA’s explicit introduction of “bad faith”
into the Lanham Act, “willfulness” has a long and storied
history in trademark law and is, in some jurisdictions, a
requirement for an award of damages under section
1117(a). 252 This subpart argues that where defendant’s
willfulness is established under the Lanham Act
independently of any conduct within the ambit of the “bad
1086 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that “the Ninth Circuit has upheld awards of
attorneys’ fees solely because, by entry of default judgment, the district court
determined, as alleged in [plaintiff’s] complaint, that [defendant’s] acts were
committed knowingly, maliciously, and oppressively, and with an intent to . . .
injure [plaintiff]. Here, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants’ acts were ‘willful and
deliberate.’ Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to
attorneys’ fees.”) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
249. Accord Leighton, supra note 50, at 880 (“ ‘ Exceptional cases’ within the
meaning of that subsection are limited to (1) cases in which the defendant
willfully violated the Act”).
250. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 6 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (1974).
251. See Leighton, supra note 50, at 881.
252. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 30:92 (4th ed. 2011) (“In most cases of judicial increases in
damages or profits, the defendant is at least a knowing and intentional
infringer”); Ross, supra note 42, at § 4.02[2][b] (collecting cases that require or
at least consider willful infringement in deciding whether to award various
remedies under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) following a 1999 amendment that added the
words “or a willful violation under section 43(c)” to the first sentence of section
(a)).
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faith intent to profit” factors under the ACPA, the case is
indeed “exceptional” and a court may proceed to consider
whether an attorney’s fees award is appropriate in its
discretion.
Distinguishing between “bad faith intent to profit” and
“willfulness” can be as analytically tricky as distinguishing
between “bad faith intent to profit” and “exceptional” conduct
warranting a discretionary award of attorney’s fees. In City
of Carlsbad v. Shah, 253 the court began its analysis of “bad
faith intent to profit” under the ACPA by stating that it must
“look at the individual circumstances of the case, including
whether the infringing activity was willful.” 254 Not only does
this obviously confuse “bad faith intent to profit” analysis
with willfulness analysis, but the authority cited for the
proposition, Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 255 , addresses an
entirely different issue—not bad faith intent to profit, but
willfulness in the context of determining whether the ACPA’s
safe harbor provisions applied to defendant’s behavior. 256
Similarly, later in the same discussion, court stated that:
In determining bad faith intent, “[w]illfulness can be
inferred by the fact that a defendant continued infringing
behavior after being given notice” of the allegations of
infringement. Louis Vuitton Malletier and Oakley, Inc. v.
Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Additionally, the courts consider the egregiousness of the
defendant’s cybersquatting and other behavior evidencing
an attitude of contempt. Verizon California, Inc. v.
Onlinenic, Inc., 2009 WL 2706393 *3–6 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 257

However, both Veit and Verizon California discussed
willfulness in the context of determining the appropriate
amount of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)—a
discussion that would only be appropriate after a finding of
“bad faith intent to profit” under the ACPA. 258
253. City of Carlsbad v. Shah, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. 586 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009)
256. Shah, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (citing Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1203).
257. Id.
258. See also Two Plus Two Pub., LLC v. Boyd, No. 2:09-CV-02318-KJD,
2012 WL 724678 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2012) (engaging in an extensive, factor-byfactor, bad faith intent analysis on a motion for summary judgment, concluding
that the plaintiff had made an undisputed showing that the defendant acted
with bad faith intent to profit, awarding statutory damages based on that
showing and “scant evidence of Defendant’s success,” and also finding, without
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It is also important to note that a pattern and practice of
cybersquatting falls within the ambit of ACPA factor eight:
In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent
described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to . . . the person’s
registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly
similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time
of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous
marks of others that are famous at the time of registration
of such domain names, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties. 259

Thus, willful conduct that consists only of “serial”
cybersquatting is not sufficient to render a cybersquatter’s
conduct “exceptional.” 260
An example of willfulness separable from “bad faith
intent to profit” is In re Gharbi, 261 where the bankruptcy
court appropriately engaged in a factor-by-factor ACPA
analysis finding that the defendant did not have any
intellectual property rights in three disputed domain names
additional discussion, “that because Defendant’s conduct was willfull [sic] it
qualifies as ‘exceptional’ and awards attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff.”).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII) (2012).
260. Cf. Lahoti, 636 F.3d at 510–11 (finding that infringement is exceptional
when a defendant knowingly registered plaintiff’s mark as a website address,
tried to extort thousands of dollars from the plaintiff, had a pattern and practice
of cybersquatting, and had a pattern of abusive discovery and litigation
conduct); Harry & David v. Pathak, No. CIV. 09-3013-CL, 2010 WL 4955780 (D.
Or. Oct. 29, 2010), adopted by, No. CIV. 09-3013-CL, 2010 WL 4955715 (D. Or.
Nov. 30, 2010); Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Onlinenic, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009
WL 2706393 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) (considering a “pattern or practice” of
registering and using multiple domain names (in that case, 663) that are
“identical or confusingly similar” to a plaintiff’s marks (ACPA bad faith factor
eight) “willful and outrageous conduct alone [] sufficient for the Court to
conclude that Verizon must be awarded its reasonable attorneys’ fees under §
1117.” The Verizon court also found defendant’s failure to oppose plaintiff’s
argument for attorney’s fees and its attendant concession that the case was
“exceptional” was an independent basis for finding the case to be, in fact,
“exceptional.”); Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 487 (3d Cir. 2001). In some
cases there may be both serial cybersquatting (bad faith perhaps, but
unexceptional under the argument advanced here) and truly exceptional, willful
conduct. See GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV07-01870 AHM VBKX, 2012 WL
3962789 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) (finding that defendants registered over
1,300 domain names and that they “attempted, only a few months ago, to
‘reverse hijack’ Plaintiff’s domain name, gopets.net”).
261. In re Gharbi, No. 08-11023-CAG, 2011 WL 831706 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
Mar. 3, 2011), aff’d, No. A-11-CA-291 LY, 2011 WL 2181197 (W.D. Tex. June 3,
2011).
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(ACPA factor one); that although defendant had a license to
use plaintiff’s mark in defendant’s domain names under a
franchise agreement (ACPA factor three), termination of that
agreement revoked the license and defendant was on notice
that he no longer had any right to use the mark (ACPA factor
four); 262 and that following termination of the franchise
agreements, defendant used plaintiff’s mark (as incorporated
in the disputed domain names) for commercial purposes after
the termination of the agreement (ACPA factor five). 263
Awarding statutory damages under subsection (d) and
attorney’s fees under subsection (a), the bankruptcy court
stated that:
In making the determination that Defendant violated the
ACPA, the Court holds that Defendant acted with the bad
faith intent to profit from Plaintiff’s marks. [Additional
testimony] shows that Defendant knew that what he was
doing was wrong and Defendant was previously told by
the Plaintiff to cease using the marks. Defendant acted
willfully in choosing to keep the websites at issue in
operation and to use them as pointers to his new website.
The Court therefore finds that Defendant’s conduct
renders this an exceptional case and Plaintiff is entitled to
reasonable attorneys’ fees. 264

Willfulness will most often be found in cases of
“deliberate and flagrant” infringement, as in Newport News
Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 265 a recent case
from the Fourth Circuit, where the district court found the
defendant had transformed a website into a women’s fashion
website after being put on notice by a decision of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) that
the plaintiff—a women’s clothing and accessories company—
had rights in the marks at issue. 266 Because the defendant
was unable “to provide a legitimate justification for its
262. The court also found that although the defendant had the right to use
the trademark at issue in his company’s domain names under certain franchise
agreements (that is, he did not register or initially use the domain names with
bad faith intent to profit), once the agreements were terminated, he no longer
had use of the mark and did not fall within the ACPA’s safe harbor provision.
In re Gharbi, 2011 WL 831706.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423,
441 (4th Cir. 2011).
266. Id.
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decision to shift its website’s focus to women’s clothing,
particularly in the face of the ICANN panel’s implicit
suggestion that to do so courted the risk of a finding of bad
faith,” the district court’s finding that the case was
“exceptional” was not clear error. 267
Finally, as noted above, the latest addition to 15 U.S.C. §
1117, subsection (e), establishes a rebuttable presumption of
willfulness “for purposes of determining relief” if a
cybersquatter “knowingly provides . . . materially false
contact information to a domain name registrar, domain
name registry, or other domain name registration authority
in registering, maintaining, or renewing a domain name used
in connection with the violation.” 268
Thus, in Translucent Communications, LLC v. Americas
Premiere Corp., 269 the court methodically applied the bad
faith intent factors, determining that seven of the nine listed
in section 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) “weigh[ed] in favor of Translucent
and clearly demonstrate a bad faith intent by Defendants.” 270
The court also stated that defendants’s diversion of internet
users from plaintiff’s website was “strong evidence of
Defendants’ bad faith intent and this factor alone, Factor five,
sufficiently establishes Defendants’ bad faith intent.” 271
Further, citing section 1117(e), 272 the court determined that
one of the defendants provided false contact information to
the disputed domain name’s registrar and diverted plaintiff’s
domain name “to exact punishment or harm,” conduct the
court found to be “egregious” for purposes of assessing
statutory damages. 273 When assessing attorney’s fees, the
court specifically cited the latter—defendant’s diversion of
plaintiff’s domain name via the provision of false contact
information—as a basis for finding that defendants’
“malicious, fraudulent, willful, [and] deliberate” conduct
rendered the case “exceptional.” 274
267. Id.
268. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(e) (2008); see also supra notes 94–96 and accompanying
text.
269. Translucent Commc’s, LLC v. Ams. Premiere Corp., No. CIV.A. WGC08-3235, 2010 WL 723937 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2010).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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4. An Attempt at Simplification
The Venn diagram below is useful in illustrating how
these three areas of conduct—“bad faith intent to profit,”
litigation conduct, and willful conduct—interrelate. As stated
above, facts supporting the elemental determination of “bad
faith intent to profit” that do not also support a finding of
either litigation misconduct or conduct considered willful
under the Lanham Act, are insufficient to support a finding
that a case involves “exceptional” cybersquatting.

Bad faith intent to
profit
(unexceptional
alone)

Litigation
misconduct

Willful conduct

Conversely, where facts supporting the determination
that an alleged cybersquatter possessed the requisite “bad
faith intent to profit” also support a finding of litigation
misconduct or willful conduct (that is, where “bad faith intent
to profit” overlaps with either litigation misconduct, willful
conduct, or both), a finding that a case is “exceptional” is
appropriate and attorney’s fees award may be awarded. And,
where facts in addition to those supporting a determination
that an alleged cybersquatter possessed the requisite “bad
faith intent to profit” establish that the cybersquatter also
engaged in litigation misconduct or willful conduct (or both),
the case is similarly “exceptional.”
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CONCLUSION
This review and analysis of the text and legislative
history of the ACPA and the Lanham Act’s remedial
provisions and the selective survey of relevant case law
presented
here
persuasively
demonstrate
several,
interrelated principles.
First, notwithstanding certain
language in the Ninth Circuit’s K and N Engineering decision
that suggests attorney’s fees awards under the Lanham Act
are “tied” to awards of actual damages and profits, there is no
basis for an outright denial of an attorney’s fees award to a
plaintiff who elects to receive statutory damages instead of
actual damages for a violation of the ACPA.
Second, and more importantly, in determining whether a
case is truly “exceptional” for purposes of making an
attorney’s fees award given a violation of the ACPA (either in
conjunction with an actual or statutory damages award),
there must be a distinction between the conduct constituting
the violation itself (which is in no way “exceptional”) and the
“exceptional” conduct that warrants the exercise of the court’s
discretion to make that attorney’s fees awards.
This
distinction is necessary to preserve the meaning of the term
“exceptional,” honor the intent and purpose behind its
inclusion in the Lanham Act (as well as the policies
underlying the American Rule), and give the ACPA its proper
scope within the broader context of trademark law.

